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I 
Summary 
 
The shortcomings triggered by a more globalized, and in some respects uncontrolled scenario, 
together with a too weak response in terms of general strategy of European Union’s institutions, 
seem to have pushed forward to new proto-nationalist approaches in a considerable number of 
European Member States. performed by new and emerging political actors classified under the 
very broad labels of “populist parties” or “far-right wing parties”.  
At the same time, the persuasive and widespread power gained by these new rising political 
subjects could represent a worrying development on a double and interconnected terrain, which 
should neither be underestimated: a domestic one, concerning a potential conflict with the 
traditional liberal-democratic values, which underpin the EU legal framework, particularly, the 
European Convention on Human Rights and, a cross-border one, represented by the potential risk 
for the proper balance between international community and national orders, especially 
concerning the consistency with the area of the fundamental rights. 
Starting from the understanding of the broad definition of the term “populism”, a very fluid 
scheme capable of multiple and manifold meanings, the thesis will briefly analyse, preliminary, a 
double component on the back of the populism argument, economic and social, which seems to 
be significant to grasp and address the reasons of the ever-increasing appeal of radical parties 
amongst the European electorate. Afterwards, the dissertation should turn the attention to the 
primary and central theme concerning the impact of populist policies on the European legal 
framework, and more specifically on the consistency with the European Convention on Human 
Rights, narrowing down the inquiry on the potential attempts to limit three fundamental rights 
enshrined in the Convention: freedom of expression (Art. 10), freedom of association and 
assembly (Art. 11) and, lastly, freedom of thought, conscience and religion (Art. 9). 
Therefore, the leading research questions of this thesis are the following: 1) analysing and 
discussing whether the recent activities and programmes of populist/movements, especially those 
in Hungary and Poland, are consistent with the freedom of expression outlined by Article 10 of 
the Convention; 2) analysing and discussing whether “Stop Soros”, the latest populist outcome in 
Hungary, is consistent within the meaning of the right of freedom of association and assembly as 
arranged by Article 11 of the Convention; 3) analysing and discussing whether some prolematic 
populist legal reforms and, above all, the general tendency amongst the European States to ban 
religious garments and the Swiss referendum pertaining the prohibition to erect new minarets, are 
consistent with the spirit of Article 9 of the Convention which establishes the core elements of 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion. 
In order to perceive whether these three fundamental rights should be considered at stake 
by some of the new arising populist tendencies, it will be crucial to refer the research to the 
developing case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHtR) as well as to the soft law 
instruments of the most relevant international institutions in interpreting the meaning and the 
extensions of the rights protected by the Convention and the duty of States of performing their 
actions by means of positive obligations that the national authorities should fulfil for protecting 
and respecting the European legal obligations. 
 
 
II 
Firstly, the research will address the fundamental right of freedom of expression as 
portrayed by Article 10 of the Convention, intended by the Court as one of the essential 
foundations for a democratic society, which, however, may be limited on the basis of specific 
grounds enshrined in Article 10 (2) of the Convention, after it is worth to analyse, albeit briefly, a 
peculiar limitation of the freedom consisted in the prohibition of hate speeches and subsequently, 
above all, to focus the attention on the relevant issue of pluralism and independence of the media 
outlets; later on, the inquiry will shift to some contemporary populist threats, in particular on the 
new legal reforms drafted by Hungary and Poland where populist parties are in power, which 
could in some way threaten and reduce the meaning of the scope of the right and, finally, it is 
worthwhile to consider what could be a conceivable strategy for the future with the purpose of 
advance the enforcement of the specific right at issue. 
Secondly, the investigation will shift to the scrutiny of the right of freedom of association 
and assembly as outlined by Article 11 of the Convention, highlighting, beforehand, the Court’s 
most relevant judgments describing the main traits of the legal provision, and a closer look 
should involve the engagement between freedom of association and the rights of non-
governmental organizations as expression of civil society needs; afterwards, the analysis and the 
discussion will move into the main populist threats and, in particular, the most controversial one 
that apparently is the “Stop Soros bill” presented to the Hungarian parliament by the populist 
party Fidesz, later on, the thesis will try address whether this questionable populist outcome 
could clash with the scope and the significance of freedom of assembly and association; 
ultimately, the examination will try to respond to the critical question of the enforcement of the 
right, trying to outline some feasible and concrete paths to follow and, among them, a stronger na 
dmore incisive role of national authorites to ensure the conformity between international and 
national law expressed along the lines of the Csullog judgment. 
Thirdly and finally, the present investigation will deal with the populist parties’ attempts to 
limit the freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, right bordered by Article 9 of the 
Convention, discussing, first of all, the European legal basis and the various relevant 
interpretation provided by the European Court of Human Rights, after that, it might be significant 
to consider the sensitive and discussed issue of the prohibition of religious symbols, underlining, 
at the same time, the contrast between some recent international judgments; subsequently, it will 
be necessary to mentioning and discussing the main populist threats and amongst them, the recent 
constitutional reform passed in Switzerland on the ban on the construction of new minarets and, 
latterly, the succeeding question to cope with should be the argument of the enforcement of the 
right, considering the prominent role that other actors, especially non legal, must play with more 
vigour into the international scenario.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The gradual advent of an ever-widening scenario of populist politics could be a particularly 
worrying development throughout the European Union for several reasons and, among the many, 
the contemporary relationship between the national and international law which often results in 
boosting, old and new, tensions.  
Since the mid-20th century it has been widely recognized that constitutional and parliamentary 
democratic systems are necessary to limit the notion of absolute sovereignty of the people; the 
latter, however, in the current populist scenario always prevails over any other right or value in 
the populist discourse with the aim of further affirming their legitimacy which derives from the 
assumption that populist parties are the only subject able to stands for the pure people in the fight 
against the corrupted elite represented by the old and outdated previous order; hence, in this new 
scenario, the will of the people turned into the fundamental value with regard to which all the 
other values are subordinated. 
The liberal-democratic mantra, which traces its genesis to the 18th century, birth of the season 
of the Enlightenment, was that values, such as pluralism, inclusive debate and the protection of 
minority interests against aggressive form of majoritarianism were essential tools for maintaining 
a more stable and inclusive society, as well as for the promotion of a wealthier democratic 
environment indispensable for the progress of the people and, at the same time, to the betterment 
of humankind.  
The populist parties, however, seem to approach to the validity of liberal-democratic values 
with great caution and skepticism due to the fact that they consider them as latent threats capable 
of undermining the stability of national legal orders, as a result, they tend to expand a wide range 
of protectionist policies and conceive an ever-growing popping up of legal reforms aiming to 
exclude from political life and social debates an increasing number of actors and, amongst them, 
media and non governmental organisations, in particular. 
Consequently, the populism argument gives rise to many meaningful concerns; first and 
foremost, the potential fracture with these rights, especially those expressed in the European 
Convention on Human Rights, which are the concrete manifestation of the liberal-democratic 
values, mainly freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and association and freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion; moreover, and as a predictbale effect in all the cases where an 
infringement could occur, populism represents a really harduous challenge for the international 
community as a whole on the issue of the implementation or enforcement of the rights violated. 
The effect of these frictions could threaten the very essence of the European Union’s values, 
as treasured in the European Convention on Human Rights’ body, which in its preamble affirmed 
with extraordinary vigor that “the governments of European countries which are like-minded and 
have a common heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law, to take the 
first steps for the collective enforcement of certain of the rights stated in the Universal 
Declaration”. 
 
 
 
2 
1.1 The manifold meaning of the term populism 
The adjective populism is not the clearest, it is a really nebulous concept, and the term is 
often abused in political discourses, since calling someone a populist is to express a negative 
evaluation of the actor or his/her political program1; in fact, many scholars have suggested a long 
list of multiple definitions with the attempt to describe a very complex and often varied 
phenomenon. 
In fact, the adjective “populism” has become a fashionable term, and it is increasingly used as 
a very general and broad label for political parties which challenge the status quo and the 
establishment elite; this excessive use is indeed problematic: as a matter of fact, using the 
populism adjective too widely dilutes its meaning, making it difficult to identify the real populist 
threat that afflicts our democracies; therefore, it is essential to be precise about what it does and 
what does not constitute a populism matter. 
As a result, while it has many different forms, populist acts, individuals, and movements 
show some common characteristics: they tend to be anti-establishment, to respond to widespread 
public grievances and appeal to people’s emotions, to invoke the will of the people in order to put 
themselves above democratic institutions and overcome obstacles which stand along the way. 
The people are presented as a single, monolithic entity with one coherent view, by claiming 
exclusive moral authority to act on their behalf, populism seeks to delegitimize all other 
opposition and courses of action. 
All actions are justified by this exclusive so-called “moral authority.” 
In Europe, since the end of the Cold War2, we are witnessing the massive emergence of an 
ever-increasing number of atypical political parties within a long list of European Member States; 
scholars tend to classify them under the label “populist party” or the more general “populism 
trend”; however, any attempts at classification seems not to be accurate enough because the 
populist phenomenon is less homogenous than it appears at first sight. 
Indeed, there is an ongoing and lively debate on the definitions of populism, which means 
political ideas and activities that aim to gain the support of the ordinary people by giving them 
what they literally want3. 
There are several schools of thought on it, amongst them the following: populism should be 
viewed as both a discourse and a form of government4, or a moralistic imagination and fantasy of 
politics, a way of perceiving the world that sets a morally pure and fully unified, populist leaders 
don’t like mediating institutions at all, that is, institutions standing between them and the people, 
be those the mass media or other parties, they deal with the real people directly, they establish 
their megaphones5. 
                                               
1 Smilov, “Populism, Courts and the Rule of Law: Eastern European Perspectives,” p. 2. 
2 See, OSCE, Strengthening Dialogue, Trust and Security in the OSCE Region at the Heart of German Chairmanship 
in 2016 (2016). 
3 Definition of Cambridge Dictionary. 
4 De la Torre, “The Promise and Perils of Populism, University Press of Kentucky,” p. 32.  
5 See, Muller, What is Populism?, p. 25. 
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Cas Mudde, one of the leading scholar on the populism phenomenon, suggests that a minimal 
definition of populism is to be preferred as a “thin-centred ideology that considers society to be 
ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, the pure people versus the 
corrupt elite, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale of the 
people”6; on the other hand, other scholars7 proposed a refutation of the ideological theory 
suggested by Mudde, citing the works of Ernesto Laclau8, which emphasized the exacerbation of 
personalistic leaderships and the role of the leader as a representation of the nations’ interests 
against its conceptual enemies, and the proponents of the frame theory, which combine a research 
focused on empirical approach and cooperation with other fields of study such as social sciences. 
However, describing populism in a purely theoretical way could be extremely misleading and 
sometimes inappropriate because of the multiple appearances and manifestations of populist 
parties that, for their part, are hostile to being categorized or even just described by scholars, 
political scientists, sociologists: in one word they do not want to be portrayed by the “corrupted 
elites”. 
Therefore, according to this preliminary empirical explanation, we can contemplate as 
populist parties, the pursuing European parties9: Fidesz and Jobbik in Hungary, Law & Justice in 
Poland, Five star movement and North League in Italy, Freedom Party of Austria in Austria, 
Swiss People’s Party in Switzerland, Front National in France, National Front for the Salvation of 
Bulgaria and IMRO in Bulgaria, ANO 2011 in Czech Republic, Danish People’s Party in 
Denmark, Finns Party in Finland, Kotleba in Slovakia, National Alliance in Latvia, Conservative 
People’s Party of Estonia in Estonia, UKIP in United Kingdom, New Flemish Alliance in 
Belgium, VMRO-DPMNE in Macedonia, Progress Party in Norway, Sinn Féin in Ireland, Party 
for Freedom in the Netherlands, Sweden Democrats in Sweden, Alternative for Germany in 
Germany and others minor parties. 
 
1.2 The twofold component 
Real issues lie behind the surge of populism: economic dislocation and inequality caused by 
globalization, automation and, technological changes; the attempt to address these complex issues 
is not simple, but populists tend to respond less by proposing positive solutions. The result has 
been a frontal assault on the values of inclusivity, tolerance, and respect that lie at the heart of 
human rights10. 
A crucial factor that increases the fashion of populist parties is the concept of instability, both 
in term of economy and concerning values and identity. 
 
                                               
6 Mudde, “Are Populists Friends or Foes of Constitutionalism?”, p. 3. 
7 Cf., Aslanidis, “Is populism an Ideology? A Refutation and a New Perspective”. 
8 See, Laclau, On Populist Reason. 
9 See, Annex 3. 
10 Roth, “The pushback Against the Populist Challenge”.  
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1.2.1 The economic component11 
Another element that pushes the populist parties forward is the one expressed by K. Roth 
when he states that people “feel left behind by technological change, the global economy, and 
growing inequality.”12  
A study by Gallup (World Poll, 2016) also claims that populist votes, in 18 out of 27 
countries in the European Union, tend to increase when people are discouraged by their future; 
for this purpose, the study takes into account three variables: no confidence in national 
government, future life poorly viewed relative to current life and disaffection and 
discouragement. The analysis reveals that people in countries with recent populist trends tend to 
have a combination of low trust in government and low or static expectations for their future lives 
because of financial reasons.13 
In particular, France, the UK and Slovenia rank in the top 10 EU countries with the highest 
percentage of disaffected and discouraged residents and Germany and the Netherlands as well 
have a high rate of disaffected and discouraged people, respectively 27% and 28%14; overall, the 
findings of the report suggest that growing deficits of hope and trust are more likely to be 
prevalent in countries experiencing a rise in populism support and if they earn enough to make 
their living and provide a good future for their children, this situation will most likely change15. 
Capitalism and the free market economy are widespread throughout the world. However, 
capitalism causes inequality, which triggers the wick of disorder, although capitalism promotes 
the idea of equal rights and opportunities, inequality is rooted in the capitalism itself. In the 
capitalist system, the rich are becoming richer, while the poor are getting increasingly poor. 
Low wages, minimal job security, and vulnerability to social risks make people vulnerable to 
the appeals of radical right parties16; economic inequality has been  exacerbated by increasing 
automation and outsourcing, globalization and growing mobility of capital and labour, the 
erosion of workers’ unions, neoliberal austerity policies, the growth of the knowledge economy 
and the limited capacity of democratic governments to regulate investments made by 
multinational companies or to stem migratory flows17. 
According to many studies, economic inequality is increasing (CBO, 201118, OECD, 
200819, Piketty, 201420, UNDP, 2016). The OECD Report confirms the argument: “Overall, over 
the entire period from the mid-1980s to the mid-2000s, the dominant pattern is one of a fairly 
                                               
11 On this argument see, O’Connor, “Three Connections between Rising Economic Inequality and the Rise of 
Populism”. 
12 Roth, “The Dangerous Rise of Populism”; cf., Giulio Tremonti, “Mundus Furiosus: Il riscatto degli Stati e la fine 
della lunga incertezza,” p. 15. 
13 Zapryanova and Christiansen, “Hope, Trust Deficits may help fuel populism” Gallup, April 7, 2017. 
14 See Annex 1. 
15 See, Zapryanova and Christiansen, supra note 13. 
16 See, e.g., Betz, “Radical Rightwing Populism in Western Europe”; Ignazi, “Extreme right parties in Western 
Europe”. 
17 Inglehart and Norris, “Trump, Brexit and the Rise of Populism: Economic Have-Nots and Cultural Backlash”. 
18 Congress of the United States, Congressional Budget Office. Trends in the Distribution of Household Income 
Between 1979 and 2007. 
19 OECD, Are we growing unequal?New evidence on changes in poverty and incomes over the past 20 years. 
20 Piketty, Capital. 
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widespread increase in inequality”; the Human Development Report 2016 of UNDP21, confirms 
that the absolute inequality is increasing since 1975. 
A World Bank report22, furthermore, linked the rise of populist parties to the deepening of 
economic inequalities and poverty; the earnings of the poorest 10% of European citizens fell by 
7% decades, while the profits of the EU’s wealthiest 10% grew by 66%. The impoverished 
regions of Eastern Europe, such as Hungary and Poland, still have less than 50% of the EU 
average GDP per capita, even if the national economies in the east have prospered; other 
countries such as Greece and Italy have low productivity and low wage growth; moreover, 
technological change has wiped out 15% of manual jobs in Europe over the past 15 years, 
especially in countries like Austria, Bulgaria, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Romania, and 
Slovenia. 
Drawing on these arguments, the thesis of economic insecurity explains populism as a 
product of stagnant or falling real income, due to global markets, the growing income disparity 
and the loss of faith that the main parties, traditional parties, will respond to these concerns; if 
this thesis is right, the logic is that mass support for populism should be concentrated among the 
economically marginalized sectors that are the main losers from global markets and technological 
advances, so populist votes should be the strongest chimera among the following categories: 
unskilled workers, the unemployed and families’ dependent on social benefits. 
For instance, following this path, a report shows that individual-level radical right support 
in Western Europe was significantly stronger among the unemployed, the less educated workers 
and men23; at the same time, however, some other researchers suggest reasons for doubting on 
that argument. For example, one study argues that “we should look sceptically upon the idea that 
the radical right is purely a phenomenon of the politics of resentment among the new social 
cleavage of low-skilled and low-qualified workers in inner-city areas, or that their rise can be 
attributed in any mechanical fashion to growing levels of unemployment and job insecurity in 
Europe. The social profile is more complex than popular stereotypes suggest”24.  
Cas Mudde is equally dubious about a purely economic explanation for the rise of 
populism25; besides, populist parties have also arisen in some of the more egalitarian European 
societies, with cradle-to-grave welfare states, which contain some of the most educated and safest 
populations in the world, such as Sweden and Denmark.26 
The contemporary version of the economic vulnerability argument links these developments 
directly with rising mass support for populism, which is understood to reflect divisions between 
the winners and losers from global markets, and thus whether one’s life is secure or insecure27. 
 
 
                                               
21 UNDP (United Nation Development Programme), Human Development Report 2016, Human Development for 
Everyone. 
22 World Bank, Growing United: Upgrading Europe’s Convergence Machine. 
23 Lubbers, Gijsberts, and Scheepers, “Extreme right-wing voting in Western Europe,” p. 350. 
24 Kitschelt and McGann, “The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis,” p. 147. 
25 Mudde, “Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe,” Chapter 5. 
26 Ibid., p. 9.  
27 Bornschier, “Cleavage Politics and the Populist Right: the New Cultural Conflict in Western Europe”, p. 171. 
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1.2.2 The social component 
The other decisive factor behind the rise of populist parties is the question of identity, which 
is for populist parties an intense propaganda argument based on the distinction “us-them,” to 
construct the native identity because the people need to delineate their boundaries with other 
different identities, i.e., those of the non-natives; in other words, to build the in-group (“us”) it is 
necessary to form the out-groups (“them”), populist parties seek the salvation of people (“the 
pure people”), promising them a clear identity and protection against the unsteady world28. 
According to Bronislaw Misztal, identity is a kind of gathering of knowledge and skills, that 
lets us know our separateness or similarities, our cognitive, emotional, moral, and political 
qualifications that define our role and place in the world29 and one of the processes that intensify 
the search of identity is the phenomenon of the globalization30; indeed, economic and cultural 
globalization has increased the uncertainty about a vague identity that is not based on a traditional 
pattern; therefore, people seek vigorously, even hysterically, their identities all over the world31. 
In this extraordinarily intricate and tortuous context, another component adds more 
complexity to the matter: the question of a European identity; indeed, the identity issue has seen 
as a crucial element in Europe: European citizens face a substantial identity problem in the 
context of modern EU democracy in a scenario characterized by various language, religion, 
customs, traditions, and history. 
In fact, it is quite debated that European identity can be defined as a concept of civilization 
based on religion, on shared history and on values that pertain only Western Europe, an approach 
that seems to be inaccurate and slightly more than problematic. If we define the European 
identity taking into consideration just the Christian religion, therefore we eliminate a large and 
growing number of Muslims born and resident in Europe; however, the notion of common 
history in the European context should be instead defined as everyday learning of mistakes that 
should not be repeated in the future. 
Most importantly, the notion or the need of a particular and specific identity suffers this 
critical paradoxically leak: identities are always built against others; it makes no sense to say: I 
am European if it does not imply differences between being African, Asian or American. 
So, in this perspective, the clash with globalization is impressive and majestic: globalization 
draws its strength from the concept that everyone, each person, every customer or client, should 
be the same as the others, without differences of identity, only different tastes or preferences for 
goods that need to be sold in the global market to as many people as possible. 
 
 
 
                                               
28 Mudde, supra note 25, p. 63. 
29 Misztal, “Identity and the future of Nation States,” p. 24. 
30 Szatlach, “European Identity and Populism,” p. 70.  
31 Ibidem. 
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2. MAIN FEATURES  
However, leaving aside the ideological and social features, the principal populist parties 
across Europe show a sort of common agendas on future political plans regarding some crucial 
issues, such as: the attack on the independence of the judiciary, the erosion of the checks and 
balances mechanisms, the anti-refugee policies, the discredit of the international institutions 
including the role of the Courts and the weakening of the authority of international law and of the 
human rights regulatory framework. 
In any case, in this research, given the enormous amount of criticisms triggered by the 
populist argumentation, we must confine the field only on some of them, probably the least 
developed by scholars, and more precisely on the following three domains: the various attempts 
to undermine the freedom of expression, in particular as regards the general role of media and 
their impartiality and independence, the efforts to erode the freedom of association and assembly, 
and finally the attempts, primarily by prospering and fostering hate speeches and hatred 
propaganda to weaken and discredit the other religious beliefs and, therefore, the specific 
potential threats to the freedom of thought, conscience and religion. 
Importantly, it is significant also to underline that the three aforementioned freedoms are 
extremely linked to each other so, as a consequence, a potential populist approach could be 
worrying on several legal grounds and a violation of one of those three rights could involve 
another violation with a really problematic “domino effect”, especially, in relation to freedom of 
expression and freedom of assembly and association due to the fact that the latter protect in an 
indirect way also the first one; therefore, from the same populist behaviour could come up an 
extremely complexed effect in terms of relationship between different rights.  
Philip Alston advises, in a very far-sighted way, the international community on the 
complexity of the anti-human rights agenda that characterized many populist political leaders: 
“The nationalistic, xenophobic, misogynistic, and explicitly anti-human rights agenda of 
many populist political leaders requires human rights proponents to rethink many 
longstanding assumptions. There is a need to re-evaluate strategies and broaden outreach 
while reaffirming the basic principles on which the human rights movement is founded. 
Amongst the challenges are the need to achieve more effective synergies between 
international and local human rights movements and to embrace and assert economic and 
social rights as human rights rather than as welfare or development objectives. It will be 
crucial to engage with issues of resources and redistribution, including budgets, tax policy, 
and fiscal policies. There is a need for collaboration with a broader range of actors, to be 
more persuasive and less didactic, and to be prepared to break with some of the old 
certainties. Academics should pay attention to the unintended consequences of their 
scholarship, and everyone in the human rights movement needs to reflect on the 
contributions each can make”32 
 
 
 
 
                                               
32 Alston, “The Populist Challenge to Human Rights,” p. 1. 
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2.1 Attempts to limit freedom of expression 
2.1.1 European legal basis 
Freedom of expression is a precondition for healthy democracies, in the context of an 
effective democracy and respect for human rights mentioned in the preamble of the Convention; 
furthermore, it is not only valuable in itself, but it also plays a central role in the protection of the 
other rights established by the Convention, such as the freedom of association and assembly and 
the freedom of thought, conscience and religion. 
There can not be a democratic society without the fundamental right to freedom of 
expression: the progress of society and the development of each depend on the possibility of 
receiving and imparting information and ideas33. 
The primary provision that defines “freedom of expression” within the European framework 
is Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights; moreover, the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union provides an identical guarantee laid down it on the 
structure of Article 11. 
Article 10 of the Convention prescribes as follows: 
“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to 
hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by 
public authority and regardless of frontiers. This article shall not prevent States from 
requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.” 
“2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may 
be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law 
and are necessary in a democratic  society, in the interests of national security, territorial 
integrity or public safety, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for 
preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the 
authority and impartiality of the judiciary”34 
As we can see, Article 10 of the Convention is structured in two different paragraphs: the 
first defines the protected freedoms (freedom to hold opinions, freedom to receive information 
and ideas, freedom to impart information and ideas); the second part describes the circumstances 
in which a State can legitimately interfere with the exercise of freedom of expression. 
Freedom of expression is said to be “one of the essential foundations of a democratic 
society and one of the basic conditions for its progress and for each individual’s self-
                                               
33 Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 1510, Freedom of Expression and Respect for Religious 
beliefs in Blasphemy (2006).  
34 Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(European Convention on Human Rights, as Amended) (ECHR), Art. 10, 1950; the other relevant European legal 
provision expressing the right of freedom of expression is the EU Charther of Fundamental Rights, which in the 
Article 11 under the Title II, Freedoms, describes that:“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion. This right includes freedom to change religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in 
community with others and in public or in private, to manifest religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice 
and observance”, “2. The right to conscientious objection is recognized, in accordance with the national laws 
governing the exercise of this right”. 
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fulfillment,”35; moreover, this is a requirement of pluralism, tolerance, and broadmindedness 
“without there being no democratic society.”36 
The Court also stated in the Ekin Association case that the rights recognized in Article 10 of 
the Convention are valid “regardless of frontiers”.37 
First of all, we should clarify what the scope of the legal provision is. 
The very essence of the right of freedom of expression is broader with respect to criticism 
of the government than it could be when some particular actors became the target of the 
restriction. Democracy, generally speaking, requires that government acts or omissions should be 
carefully scrutinized and examined, not only by the legislative and judicial bodies of the State but 
also by the citizens through the very special subject named public opinion38.  
This is necessary for the reason that “thought and opinions on public matters are of a 
vulnerable nature”, the mere possibility that the authorities will interfere, or that there will be 
interference from private parties who are not subject to proper control or who have the support of 
the authorities, is able to impose “a serious burden on the free formation of ideas and democratic 
debate and have an effect on that”39. 
Regarding the types of protected speech, the provision is not limited only to words, spoken 
or written, but also extends to images40, actions41, pictures42, cultural heritage and the display of 
symbols, such as the use of the red star in Hungary43. 
Article 10 protects the freedom of communication; this notion comprises the real and 
genuine freedom of expression, the freedom of information, the freedom of communication via 
mass media and specific parts of the freedom of artistic and academic expression44; contrary to 
the numerous national guarantees to this effect, Article 10 does not refer to any particular way or 
modalities of expressing one’s opinion that, as a consequence, should assume a broad range of 
different modalities. 
Since the exercise of these freedoms “carries with it duties and responsibilities,” Article 10 
(2), provides a list of legitimate grounds or reasons for the imposition of “such formalities, 
conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic 
society”; these conditions are as follows: the interests of national security, territorial integrity or 
public safety, the prevention of disorder or crime, the protection of health or morals, the 
protection of the reputation or rights of others, the prevention of disclosure of information 
                                               
35 See, e.g. Lingens v. Austria, no. 9815/82, §41, 8 July 1986, Series A no. 103; Palomo Sánchez and Others v. Spain 
[GC], nos. 28955/06 and 3 others, §53, ECHR 2011. 
36 Handyside v. United Kingdom, no 5493/72, §47, 7 December 1976, Series A no. 24. 
37 Association Ekin v. France, no. 39288/98, §62, ECHR 2001-VIII. 
38 Schabas, The European Convention on Human Rights, p. 452. 
39 Altuğ Taner Akçam v. Turkey, no. 27520/07, §81, 25 October 2011.  
40 See, e.g., Chorherr v. Austria, no. 13308/87, 25 August 1993, Series A no. 266-B. 
41 See, e.g., Steel and Others v. the United Kingdom, 23 September 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-
VII. 
42 See, e.g., Müller and Others v. Switzerland, 24 May 1988, Series A no. 133. 
43 Vajnai v. Hungary, no. 33629/06, ECHR 2008. 
44 Grabenwarter, European Convention on Human Rights: Commentary, p. 113-116. 
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received in confidence and, lastly, the maintenance of the authority and impartiality of the 
judiciary. 
However, to be valid under Article 10, par. 2, these “formalities, conditions, restrictions or 
penalties” must cumulatively comply with the principle of legality, the condition of a legitimate 
purpose and the principle of necessity in a democratic society.  
Therefore, the principle of freedom of expression could be limited in an enormous number 
of circumstances, for example in a recent case45 concerning the protection and responsibilities of 
non-governmental organisations when they take a social watchdog function, playing a role of 
similar importance to that of the press or media, the Grand Chamber found no violation of Article 
10 after balancing the right of freedom of expression with the right to privacy and private life and 
with the reputation of the others because the NGOs had acted negligently merely by reporting the 
alleged misconduct of the editor of the newspaper without making a reasonable effort to verify its 
accuracy. 
The first prerequisite for limiting or restricting or again disregarding the legal provision 
related to the freedom of expression is that the law must prescribe the interference performed by 
the State; however, it is necessary to underline whether this circumstance may occur. 
First of all, an interference must be prescribed by law; the primary assessment to be taken 
into consideration is the “accessibility,” the Court, in this regard, spelled out its meaning in the 
case Sunday Times v. UK and clarified that accessibility means that the citizen must be able to 
have an indication that is appropriate in the circumstances of the legal rules applicable to a 
particular case; secondly, a law must be formulated with sufficient precision because the citizen 
must be able to predict the consequences that a certain action may entail46. 
As a consequence, where an interference with one’s freedom of expression is based on a 
provision which is formulated too broadly or in a really vague way and therefore constitutes a 
constant threat to the concrete exercise of freedom of expression, then the interference is not 
considered as “prescribed by law” and, consequently, it is in violation of Article 1047. 
On this point, the Court, in the Hashman and Harrup case, observed that the expression “to 
be of good behaviour” was particularly imprecise and, therefore, did not provide to the applicants 
a sufficiently clear indication on how to behave in the future; therefore, the interference of the 
State was not regarded as covered by law. 
Furthermore, interference is not “accessible” within the meaning of predictability even if 
the laws themselves are sufficiently precise where can be found different national decisions 
concerning the same legal situation, thus, following the main principles of cohesion and 
coherence between legal provisions48. 
The second, and subsequent, prerequisite that the Court need to assess and prove in a case 
by case approach is a more complex and nebulous one: the existence of a legitimate aim. 
For instance, in the case Aydin v. Germany in which a sympathizer of Kurdish activist, 
                                               
45 Medžlis Islamske Zajednice Brčko and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina [GC], no.17224/11, ECHR 2017. 
46 Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom (no. 1), 26 April 1979, §49, Series A no. 30 
47 Altuğ Taner Akçam v. Turkey, op.cit.,§93. 
48 Goussev and Marenk v. Finland, no. 35083/97, §54, 17 January 2006. 
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Abdullah Ocalan, was prosecuted under the Law on Associations for signing a declaration in 
2001 in support the abolition of the activities of PKK imposed by order of the Minister of the 
Interior, the Court recognized a legitimate aim which was said to belong “to protect public order 
and safety”49. 
Nevertheless, it is worth to point out the existence of a distortion in the methodology 
process of the Court; in fact, a legitimate aim could be the one invokes many circumstances 
recalled by the Convention; however, it is not uncommon for the Court to just pass over the issue 
entirely and move to the heart of the debate which takes place under the rubric of “necessary in a 
democratic society”50. 
Therefore, and as a last resort of methodology, any restriction on freedom of expression 
must be “necessary in a democratic society”, this adjective implies as well the existence of 
another critic notion which needs to be assessed by the Court, that is the presence of a “pressing 
social need”; member states have some degree of interpretation (margin of appreciation) in 
assessing the existence of such necessity. 
The first step, therefore, implies the analysis of the existence of a “pressing social need,”51 
the pressing social need itself must be appreciated in the context of the interests of a democratic 
society.  
For example, when press freedom is at stake, the importance of a democratic society in 
ensuring and maintaining a free press must be weighed in balance52 and where freedom of the 
media is at risk, the national authorities have only a limited margin of appreciation to decide 
whether there is a “pressing social need” to take such measures53. 
The Court in many cases clarified that “where there has been an interference in the exercise 
of the rights and freedoms guaranteed in paragraph 1 of Article 10, the supervision must be strict, 
because of the importance of the rights in question; the importance of these rights has been 
stressed by the Court many times. The necessity for restricting them must be convincingly 
established”54. 
In exercising its power of review and control, the Court assesses the proportionality of a 
restriction on freedom of expression concerning the aim pursued, any interference 
disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued will not be deemed “necessary in a democratic 
society” and will, therefore, contravene Article 10 of the Convention55. 
On the other side, the Court in another case Bayev and Others v. Russia56, a dispute 
concerning a protest against laws that prohibit the promotion of homosexuality among minors, 
found a violation of the right to freedom of expression after discussing and arguing the standards 
of the protection of moral rules, protection of health and the rights of the others. 
                                               
49 Aydin v. Germany, no. 16637/07, §58, 27 January 2011. 
50 Schabas, op. cit., p. 471. 
51 See, i.a., Otegi Mondragon v Spain, no. 2034/07, ECHR 2011. 
52 Fatullayev v Azerbajjan, no. 40984/07, 22 April 2010. 
53 Wizerkaniuk v Poland, no. 18990/05, 5 July 2011. 
54 Autronic AG v Switzerland, 22 May 1990, §61, Series A no.; Worm v Austria, 29 August 1997, §47, Reports of 
Judgments and Decisions 1997-V. 
55 Council of Europe, Freedom of Expression in Europe, p. 9. 
56 See, Bayev and Others v. Russia, nos. 67667/09 and 2 others, ECHR 2017. 
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Further, it is important to stress that the Article 10 of the Convention it is not only designed 
to prevent people from the unlawful interference by the public authorities but, also, and indirectly 
it addresses the States to act in a certain way through performing specific actions called positive 
obligations. 
Indeed, although the essential objective of Article 10 of the Convention is to protect the 
individual against arbitrary interference by public authorities, the European Member States must 
fulfil a various range of positive obligations, as identified in the relevant judgements of the 
European Court of Human Rights and the other significant instruments of the Council of 
Europe57. 
These obligations should include legal, administrative and practical measures aiming to 
ensure the safety of journalists and to create an environment conducive to freedom of expression; 
all State authorities must meet positive obligations – executive, legislative and judicial branches – 
and at all levels, national, regional and local; however, such obligations should not impose an 
unreasonable or disproportionate burden on the national and domestic authorities. 
The States must act, for example, to protect media workers in the case of a campaign of 
violence and intimidation58, or in the event of an unlawful fire or unjustified dismissal of 
journalists59. 
In March 2000 the Court issued the ruling in the Ozgur Gundem case, which concerned 
various allegations, stating that, in view of the crucial importance of freedom of expression as 
one of the preconditions for a functioning democracy, “the exercise of this freedom does not 
depend merely on the State’s duty not to interfere, but may require positive measures of 
protection, even in the sphere of relations between individuals. In determining whether or not a 
positive obligation exists, regard must be had to the fair balance that has to be struck between the 
general interest of the community and the interest of the individual”60. 
 
2.1.2 Freedom of expression and hate speech 
A very peculiar limitation to the freedom of expression is the “prohibition of hate speech or 
racial hatred,”61 and this argument takes on particular importance with populist parties which 
often rely on “borderline speeches” for making strong propaganda campaigns amongst people. 
A speech, first of all, is qualified as a hate speech when it is addresses a person or a specific 
group of persons on the ground of somewhat classification, of ethnics or religious nature. 
The Court dealt with hate speech in several cases, for example when the expression could 
lead to ethnic hate, to negationism or revisionism, racial hate, religious hate, threat to the 
democratic order, apology of violence and incitement to hostility, circulating of homophobic 
                                               
57 See, Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, Recommendation CM/Rec (2016)4 on the protection of 
journalism and safety of journalists and other media actors (2016). 
58 See, Özgür Gündem v. Turkey, no. 23144/93, ECHR 2000-III.  
59 See, Fuentes Bobo v. Spain, no. 39293/98, 29 February 2000. 
60 Özgür Gündem v. Turkey, op.cit.,§43. 
61 Schabas, op.cit, p. 478; European Court of Human Rights, Press Unit. Factsheet on Hate speech. 
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tendencies, condoning war crimes, denigrating national identity, display flag with controversial 
connotations, incitement to ethnic, national or racial discrimination hatred, incitement to religious 
intolerance. 
For instance, in the case Gunduz v. Turkey, the Court concluded that an application filed by 
the leader of an Islamic sect, convicted of inciting others to commit crimes and incitement to 
religious hatred by publishing his views in the press was inadmissible. Due to their content and 
their violent tone, the applicant’s statements amounted to hate speech and glorification of 
violence and were thus incompatible with the fundamental values of justice and peace to which 
the preamble to the Convention referred.  
In the report in question, the applicant had also named one of the victims alluded to, a 
reasonably well-known writer who was easily recognizable by the general public and who had 
therefore been placed at risk of physical violence. The severity of the sentence (four years and 
two months in prison, together with a fine) was justified as a deterrent that could be considered 
necessary in the context of preventing public incitement from committing offences.62 
Furthermore, the Court has addressed the issue of incitement to racial discrimination or hatred 
in several cases; first and foremost, in the case Le Pen v. France63, concerning an interview with 
a newspaper released by the presidential candidate in which she asserted, among other things, 
that “the day there are no longer 5 million but 25 million Muslims in France, they will be in 
charge”, declaring that the comments could arouse feelings of rejection and hostility towards the 
Muslim community and, therefore, the interference was relevant, sufficient, proportionate and 
necessary in a democratic society. 
Likewise, in the case Féret v. Belgium64, where the applicant, a Belgian member of 
Parliament and president of the Front National in Belgium, issued slogans during the election 
campaign as “Stand up against the Islamification of Belgium”, “Stop the sham integration 
policy”, “Send non-European job-seekers home”, the Court affirmed that it was essential for 
politicians to avoid comments that could promote intolerance and provoke social tensions, 
therefore, the applicant could not rely on freedom of expression and the interference was justified 
in order to prevent disorder and protect the rights of others. 
In two cases, Norwood v. the United Kingdom65 and Belkacem v. Belgium66, the Court dealt 
with the issue of the religious hate; in the first, the applicant showed in a poster the words “Islam 
out of Britain – Protect the British People”, in the second, the applicant was the leader of the 
organization “Sharia4Belgium” and he published some videos on YouTube concerning the 
promotion of the Sharia law amongst non-Muslim groups; as a result, in both cases the 
application was declared inadmissible on the basis of the incompatibility of freedom of 
expression with hate speech, which is contrary to the values of tolerance, social peace and non-
discrimination underlined by the European Convention on Human Rights. 
It is interesting to note that in all the cases cited, the Court has often pointed out the 
                                               
62 See, Gündüz v. Turkey (dec.), no. 59475/00, §23, ECtHR 2003-XI (extracts) 
63 Le Pen v. France, no. 18788/09 (ECtHR, 20 April 2010) 
64 Féret v. Belgium, no. 15615/07, 16 July 2009 
65 Norwood v. The United Kingdom (dec.), no. 23131/03, ECHR 2004-XI 
66 Belkacem v. Belgium, no. 34367/14 (ECtHR, 27 June 2017) 
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applicability of the institutions concerning the “abuse of the right”, defined by Article 17 of the 
Convention67, according to freedom of expression may not be used to lead to the destruction of 
other rights and freedoms granted by the Convention. 
Therefore, when freedom of expression implies a case which could be considered as a “hate 
speech, or incitement to religious hatred,” the freedom itself fails and can not be considered 
guaranteed or protected by the European Convention on Human Rights. 
Finally, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe has addressed the issue in the 
Recommendation 1805 of 2007, “Blasphemy, religious insults and hate speech against persons on 
grounds of their religion.”68 
In multicultural societies it is often necessary to reconcile freedom of expression and freedom 
of thought, conscience, and religion; about hate speech, the State is primarily responsible for 
determining what should count as criminal offenses within limits imposed by the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights69. 
The Council of Europe after recalling the preliminary report adopted on March 16 and 17, 
2007 by the Venice Commission, on the basis that in a democratic society, religious groups must 
tolerate, as much other groups, critical public statements and debates on their activities, teaching 
and beliefs, provided that such criticisms do not amount to intentional and gratuitous insults or 
hate speech and do not constitute an incitement to disturb the peace or to violence and 
discrimination against members of a particular religion; public debate, dialogue and the 
improvement of communication skills of religious groups and media should be used in order to 
reduce sensitivity when it exceeds reasonable levels. 
On this multiple grounds, the Council of Europe has highlighted some helpful 
recommendations and among these the following: 
“17.2.1. Permit open debate on matters relating to religion and beliefs and do not privilege 
a particular religion, which would be incompatible with Articles 10 and 14 of the 
Convention; 
17.2.2. Penalise statements that call for a person or a group of persons to be subjected to 
hatred, discrimination or violence on the grounds of their religion as on any other grounds; 
17.2.3. Prohibit acts which intentionally and severely disturb the public order and call for 
public violence by references to religious matters, as far it is necessary in a democratic 
society in accordance with Article 10, par. 2, of the Convention; 
17.3. Encourage member states to sign and ratify Protocol No. 12 of the ECHR.”70 
 
 
                                               
67 Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(European Convention on Human Rights, as Amended) (ECHR), Art. 17, 1950 
68 Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Recommendation 1805, Blasphemy, religious insults and hate speech 
against persons on grounds of their religion (2007). 
69 Ibidem, §3. 
70 Ibid. 
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2.1.3 Pluralism and independence of media 
 
“Freedom of the press is essential to a democratic society. To uphold and protect it, and to 
respect its diversity and its political, social and cultural missions, is the mandate of all 
governments.”71 
 
Freedom of the press is a crucial topic in almost all populist debates throughout the 
European States72. 
The importance of the issue relies on the qualification of the press; in fact, media have a 
particular status because press freedom implies a corresponding public right to be informed on 
specific relevant facts73. 
Preliminary, it is relevant to clarify one apparent textual ambiguity, indeed, although the 
Article 10 does not explicitly mention the freedom of the press74, the European Court has 
elaborated a voluminous case law jurisprudence that gives to the media actors a special status and 
it is sufficient to consider that the victims of the violation of this right to are in the most of the 
cases journalists rather than other private individuals. 
Freedom of press and media, which is part of the more general freedom of expression, has a 
two-fold or dual character: on the one hand it provides people active in the journalism field with 
the individual right to inform and express opinions on relevant facts; on the other hand, press 
freedom gives to the press the guarantees recognized to an institution which could be considered 
closely linked to the democratic process flux75. 
This utmost significance is inherent to the freedom of the press, the democratic function, 
making it a fundamental constitutional value that should lead to very high requirements before 
the public authorities can impose any restrictions. 
The intimate scope of the provision is as follows: freedom of the press, on the one hand, 
seeks to protect the content delivered by the media and, on the other hand, to ensure that 
structural issues do not make it impossible to exercise or even too difficult to put in practice. 
These and such structural problems may be in the form of legal requirements or other 
circumstances, such as administrative obstacles to the media, including excessive registration, 
licensing and accreditation requirements; unjustified denial of access to information held by 
                                               
71 European Commission. European Charter on Freedom of the Press, 9 June 2009. 
72 Grabenwater, op.cit., p. 276; see Moffitt, “The Stage I: Populism and the Media,” p. 70. 
73 Grabenwarter, op.cit., p. 279. 
74 Indeed, the press is explicitly mentioned only in the Article 6 (1) in connection with the exclusion of the press and 
public from a trial. 
75 European Parliament. Press Freedom in the EU, Legal framework and challenges, 2015, p. 2. 
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government agencies; harassment, intimidation, incarceration and physical attacks, including 
murder of members of the press; restrictions on media pluralism, especially in broadcasting, 
through undue governmental control and pressure over broadcasters of favouritism toward state-
owned media76. 
A study commissioned by the Department of Information Society of the Council of Europe, 
Journalists under pressure – Unwarranted Interference77, shows that fear and self-censorship in 
Europe is particularly meaningful to consider what kind of obstacles the media sector is facing in 
the current environment. 
The European Court of Human Rights has made it clear in many cases78 that any attempt to 
remove journalists from the scene of demonstrations must undergo rigorous and strict scrutiny, 
especially in those cases where the media or journalists express their opinion on political matters. 
In fact, it is worth to mention that the Court underlined the overriding importance of the 
freedom of the press in political debates in two pivotal judgements, Lingens v. Austria79 and 
Castells v. Spain80, explaining in the first that “whilst the press must not overstep the bounds set, 
inter alia, for the protection of the reputation of others, it is nevertheless incumbent on it to impart 
information and ideas on political issues just as on those in other areas of public interest. Not 
only does the press have the task of imparting such information and ideas: the public also has a 
right to receive them”81, and in the second one that “the pre-eminent role of the press in a State 
governed by the rule of law must not be forgotten…Freedom of the press affords the public one 
of the best means of discovering and forming an opinion of the ideas and attitudes of their 
political leaders. In particular, it gives politicians the opportunity to reflect and comment on the 
preoccupations of public opinion; it thus enables everyone to participate in the free political 
debate which is at the very core of the concept of a democratic society”82. 
Having so far clarified the overall importance of the media sectors in a democratic society, 
another critical area to discuss, probably the most critical one, particularly with regards to the 
recent populist tendencies (e.g. Hungary and Poland), is what refers to the political control on 
public media or broadcasters, the limits on the political control on them and all the guarantees 
necessary to preserve the democratic process “flux”. 
In its jurisprudence, the Court has developed special rules concerning public broadcasters, 
particularly on guarantee their independence from any political influence or similar interference. 
In the case of Manole and Others v. Moldova83, the public broadcasting company, Teleradio-
Moldova (TRM), was subject to political control by the government and the ruling political party. 
                                               
76 OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe). Why free media matters, Factsheet (2012), p. 3. 
77 See, Council of Europe. Journalists Under Pressure, unwarranted interference, fear and self censorship in 
Europe.   
78 See, i.a. Pentikäinen v. Finland [GC], no. 11882/10, ECHR 2015; Selmani and Others v. The Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, no. 67259/14, 9 February 2017 
79 Lingens v. Austria, op.cit.,8 July 1986, Series A no. 103 
80 Castells v. Spain, 23 April 1992, Series A no. 236 
81 Lingens v. Austria, op.cit.,§14. 
82 Castells v. Spain, op.cit.,§26. 
83 Manole and Others v. Moldova, no. 13936/02, ECHR 2009 (extracts) 
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No guarantees of pluralism were present in its editorial policy and news and information 
programmes; furthermore, many journalists of the company complained that they had been 
subjected to a regime of censorship and that their dismissal from the company had been based 
mainly on political grounds. 
In this case, the Court confirmed that the State must be the ultimate guarantor of  the value 
of “pluralism” and that this requires that the State need to ensure that the public has access 
through television and radio to impartial and accurate information and a range of opinions and 
comments, reflecting the diversity of political outlook within the country, journalists and other 
professionals in the audio-visual media should not be prevented from imparting this information 
and commentary. Furthermore, it is essential for the proper functioning of the democracy that the 
public broadcaster transmits impartial, independent and balanced news, information and 
comment and, also, provides a forum for public discussion in which as broad a spectrum as 
possible of views and opinions can be expressed84. 
In another fundamental ruling delivered in November 1993, for the first time, the Court 
examined a public monopoly on broadcasting and transmission in the case of Informationsverein 
Lentia and others85, which concerned Austria and found on it a violation of Article 10. 
In a case in point, the Court recognized that the Austrian monopolistic system was able to 
contribute to the quality and balance of program production through the powers of control over 
the media which it conferred on the national regulatory authorities. The system, therefore, had a 
purpose consistent with the third sentence of Article 10 (1)86; however, the Court held that the 
interference that the monopoly had caused to the applicants was “not necessary in a democratic 
society” for the following reasons: 
- First, the Court stressed the fundamental role of freedom of expression in a democratic 
society, in particular, when, through the press, it provided information and ideas of 
general interest, which the public also had the right to receive87; 
 
- Secondly, pluralism, of which the State was the highest guarantor, was a particularly 
important principle concerning the audio-visual media, whose programs were often 
broadcast very broadly88; 
 
- Finally, the far-reaching nature of the restrictions that a public monopoly imposed on 
freedom of expression meant that they could only be justified if they met a pressing social 
need and above all, it cannot be argued that there be no less restrictive equivalent 
solutions to put in practice89. 
 
                                               
84 Ibidem, §51, p. 13. 
85 Informationsverein Lentia and Others v. Austria, 24 November 1993, Series A no. 276. 
86 Ibidem, §33, p. 8. 
87 Ibidem, §38, p. 9. 
88 Ibidem. 
89 Ibidem, §39, p. 9-10. 
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2.1.4 Populist threats 
In the last few years it has become even more evident that we experienced a decline in 
protections for the class of the journalists and this trend is still ongoing; numerous reports show 
that in the many European Member States (especially in the so-called Eastern block), there is an 
increasing trend of physical attacks, threats, excessive use of the criminal law instrument and a 
sharp decline of the editorial independence that led to a drastic limitation of the pluralistic values 
of the media outlets. 
Media pluralism is a crucial indicator denoting how the many Member States are failing in 
their positive obligation to foster a variety of media and a plurality of sources of information; in 
this regard, the concentration of ownership remains a widespread feature of media markets, and 
this hinders a diversified and independent media environment. 
Populist governments often restrict freedom of expression, increasing the costs of being in the 
opposition or just becoming a dissident voice, members of populist government now regularly 
smear the independence of media as agents that serve foreign interest and harm the nation90, this 
trend in Europe is particularly worrying especially when it comes to the role of the media91. 
To this end, it may be useful to recall some recent findings from various reports focused on 
the populist issue. 
According to the Report, Freedom of the Press (Freedom House, 2017)92, many European 
countries have declined in the global ranking, mainly country like Slovakia, where the prime 
minister continually attacks journalists and calls them “dirty” or “anti-Slovak”; in the 
Netherlands, where the populist leader Geert Wilders is openly opposed to some media and 
journals; in Austria, where the new government included the far-right Freedom Party always 
includes in its rhetoric the defence of “Christian Europe against Muslim migrants”. 
These type of propaganda messages could amount to the hate speech qualification, as defined 
by the relevant mentioned case law of the Court93 and, as a result, they cannot rely on the 
guarantees offered by Article 10 of Convention. 
A new report by the Freedom House, Attacks on the Record: The State of Global Press 
Freedom, 2017-201894, shows that a drastic decline of the freedom of expression in the many 
European States is still ongoing and still problematic, especially in those States where populist 
parties are in power. 
 
 
 
                                               
90 Freedom House. Nations in Transit 2018, Confronting Illiberalism.  
91 Cf. University of Vienna, Media Governance and Industries Research Lab. Far-right Nationalism and Populism in 
Europe: Assaults on Press Freedom. 
92 Freedom House. Freedom of the Press (2017).   
93 See, i.a., Le Pen v. France, op.cit; Féret v. Belgium, op.cit.; Norwood v. The United Kingdom, op.cit.; Belkacem v. 
Belgium, op.cit. 
94 Freedom House. Attacks on the Record: The State of Global Press Freedom (2017-2018). 
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The following concerning statement introduces the report: 
 
“Press freedom is facing new threats in major democracies as well as in repressive states, 
where authorities are focusing their efforts on social media and other online platforms 
after subduing the independence of major print and broadcast outlets.” 
 
As the report emphasizes from the beginning, the chief political shifts that have triggered 
this “race to the bottom” is the populist component of several governments; in fact, populist 
leaders pose a serious threat to freedom of expression for many reasons, intentionally denounce 
in a critical way the media and the factual information are labelled as “fake news”, weakening 
their credibility and exposing their narrative of the facts. 
The major populist threats exposed in the findings of the report are identified in the following 
European States: 
 
- Poland, where the National Broadcasting Council fined the leading station TVN24 of the 
equivalent of $430,000 in December 2017 for “promoting illegal activities” through its 
reporting of anti-government protests; 
 
 
- France, where when a journalist in a conference in May 2017 asked the far-right 
presidential Marine Le Pen about her involvement in a parliamentary funds scandal, her 
private bodyguard pinned the journalist’s arms behind his back and hustled him out of the 
room; 
 
- Hungary, where the wealthy businesspeople associated with the ruling Fidesz party 
acquired most of the last bastions of independent journalism, including the leading online 
newspaper and all remaining regional newspaper and the purchases went forward without 
objections from the Hungarian Competition Authority or the Media Council; 
 
- Turkey, where many journalists suffered from criminal proceedings with 73 behind bars 
as of December, according to the Committee to Protect Journalists, permanently blocked 
of Wikipedia and 17 journalists from an opposition newspaper were tried on charges of 
aiding a terrorist organization; 
 
- Serbia, where the newspaper Danas suffered a rapid cancelation of advertising contracts 
after it failed to support Aleksandar Vučić’s successful candidacy in the 2017 presidential 
election, while pro-government media were bolstered by front-page advertisements 
purchased by the ruling party95. 
 
                                               
95 Ibidem, p. 3. 
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Furthermore, according to the Report “Press Freedom Index for 2018,”96 presented by the 
NGO Reporters Without Borders (RSF) the state of media freedom is described as “really 
problematic” in many European countries, in Hungary, for example, the country was ranked 73rd 
out of 180 countries and the current situation is outlined as a “problematic” one.97 
The reduced viability of media markets challenges editorial independence; the recent case of 
the Hungarian newspaper Népsabadàg could be represented in this regard: the press, one of the 
most critical opposition outlets in Hungary, was forced to close, officially for economic reasons 
on the back, but there are many suspects on the pressure exerted by the Hungarian populist party 
Fidesz on this decision, in particular, the suspicions are exacerbated after the acquisition of 
Mediaworks, publisher of the magazine, from a company with ties with the Fidesz party98. 
Recently, the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media99, Harlem Désir, condemned 
the publication of a list of more than 200 people by a Hungarian press release which claimed that 
over 2.000 people, including those listed by name, are allegedly working to “topple or overthrow 
the government”. The Hungarian magazine Figyelo published the list on 11 April and includes 
many journalists as well as other citizens; the magazine claimed that the people on the list were 
“mercenaries” paid by US-Hungarian investor and philanthropist George Soros. 
More specifically, the Representative said that “Such blacklisting and vilification of 
journalists and others is unacceptable, dangerous and ignominious. Not only does it stigmatize 
those on the list, but it also puts their safety at risk. Journalists should not be harassed or 
intimidated for their work; therefore, I call for the full respect of the diversity of viewpoints and 
of pluralism in society by all actors”100. 
Another “problematic” context is the one in Poland, which, similarly to Hungary, the current 
situation of media is labeled as “critical,” and the country has positioned itself in 58th place out of 
180 countries, losing four positions in compared to the previous report of 2017101. 
In any case, the most worrying situation and the most significant decline in guaranteeing and 
safeguarding the right to freedom of expression involved both Hungary and Poland, where the 
populist parties are effectively in power. 
The Hungarian and Polish governments have both developed strategies to reduce the impact 
of independent media under cover to reduce foreign influence or to offer to the public more 
balanced coverage. Poland, in particular, recorded the biggest drop in the protection of the 
freedom of media in the world in 2016, according to the Freedom House report102. 
                                               
96 Reporters Without Borders. Data of press freedom ranking 2018; see Annex 3. 
97 Ibidem, focus on Hungary. 
98 Hungarian Free Press. “Hungary’s largest opposition daily shut down” and “Company with this to Fidesz party 
buys Népszabadság’s publisher”. 
99 The Representative on Freedom of the Media is an independent OSCE institution with a unique mandate to protect 
and promote media freedom in all 57 OSCE participating States. The activities include observing media 
developments as part of an early warning function and helping participating States abide b their commitments to 
freedom of expression and free media. 
100 OSCE. OSCE media freedom representative Désir condemns blacklisting of journalists in Hungary. 
101 Reporters Without Borders. Data of press freedom ranking 2018, focus on Poland. 
102 Freedom House, op.cit, supra note 94. 
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In fact, Poland has recently approved the controversial “Reform of the Media Law.”103 
In December 2015 the Polish government passed a law that allowed the treasury minister to 
appoint the heads of public radio and TV directly; moreover, according to the Journalist’s 
Association in Poland, around 163 journalists (like Piotr Maslak) and media professionals have 
been fired or dismissed by the state media since the election of the Law & Justice party104. 
The new law, in more detail, proposes the removal of guarantees for the independence of 
public service TV (TVP) and Radio (PR), giving to the government minister the exclusive power 
to appoint and dismiss all members of the Supervisory and Management Boards of TVP and PR, 
making them entirely dependent on the goodwill and favour of the government in charge.          
The plans of the Polish government contradict the commitments made by the Committee of 
Ministers of the Council of Europe in its 2012 Declaration on Public Service Media 
Governance105, which stated that the Public Service Media must remain independent of political 
or economic interference and achieve high editorial standards of impartiality, objectivity, and 
fairness106, and should be accountable and transparent as they have made the obligation to serve 
the public in all its diversity, including minority communities107. 
Council of Europe experts, Mrs. Eve Salomon and Mr. Jean-Francois Frunemont108, 
expressed concerns about the legislative texts and amongst them, on the following critical points: 
- Governance, because the procedure for the selection and appointment of members of the 
National Media Council should be more transparent, setting out in law and should ensure 
that those appointed are adequately qualified for the job, are independent from political 
influence, and represent the diversity of Polish society; 
- Protection of Journalists, because the current proposal for collective dismissal of middle 
management employees should be abandoned; 
- Content and public mission, a number of provisions in the new legislation affect media 
content and may result in reduced pluralism and editorial independence, and editorial 
control should be the responsibility of the directors and editors-in-chief, content issued by 
public service media must reflect the diversity of Polish society and should remain 
impartial and balanced; 
- The license fee system, because greater certainty should be provided over funding, but the 
reforms to the system should be more proportionate, with greater clarity given to the 
provisions relating to enforcement and the assessed adequacy of the funding and to realize 
the remit a full impact assessment is recommended109. 
Another potential threat to European democracy standards in terms of breach of the right to 
freedom of expression could be seen in the so-called “Holocaust Law”. 
                                               
103 For a comprehensive and exhaustive explanation of the Polish draft reform, see, Glowacka, “Public Media reform 
in Poland – undermining political independence of regulatory and supervisory bodies”;  Yifei, Lixiong, Bowen, 
Wu, Hao and Yinghua, “Current challenges to media freedom in Poland”. 
104 Smale and Berendt, “Poland’s Conservative Government Puts Curbs on State TV News”. 
105 Council of Europe, Declaration of the Committee of Ministers on Public Service Media Governance. 
106 Ibidem, §3. 
107 Ibidem, §4. 
108 Council of Europe, Opinion on the three draft acts regarding Polish public service media. 
109 Ibidem. 
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Under the Holocaust Law, which was led primarily by the ruling populist party, Law and 
Justice, it is considered a crime (and requires up to three years in prison) for anyone, in any part 
of the world (so, with an impressive and risky extraterritorial effect), to accuse “the Polish 
Nation” of complicity in the crimes committed by the Nazis during the Second World War; 
moreover, the law, as we already underlined above, also allows the authorities to prosecute these 
crimes outside the territory of Poland. 
This was the case, for example, of the complain filed by the Polish Anti-Defamation League 
(PDL) against an Argentinian newspaper, the news Pàgina 12, which had used a 1950 photograph 
of anti-communist Polish fighters alongside an article on the pogrom in the city of Jedwabne,  
where hundreds of Jews were killed by their Polish neighbours during the Second World War, 
according to the PDL, this was equivalent to a “manipulation aiming to harm the Polish 
nation”110. 
Therefore, we must ask ourselves to what extent these populist tendencies are consistent with 
the current European framework on the necessary guarantees needed for the respect of the right to 
freedom of expression. 
The primary duty of the States must be the protection of media and journalists from any 
interference that could lead to a violation of the fundamental role of the media in the democratic 
societies. 
In Turkey, in particular, as the previous reports clearly show, there is a growing tendency to 
resort to criminal proceedings to de-legitimate the role of journalists and, as a consequence, the 
threats to freedom of expression are particularly worrying and certainly not compatible with the 
framework outlined by the Convention. 
It is sufficient to recall the principle that the Court has emphasized in the judgment delivered 
in the case Cumpana and Mazare v. Romania111, where, considering the use of criminal tools as 
the last resort, the Court declared that prison sentences were compatible with journalists’ freedom 
of expression, only in exceptional circumstances, the most serious, and not in cases of defamation 
in which the imposition of such severe penalty could lead to a “chilling effect which works to the 
detriment of society as a whole”112  and towards the media outlets; therefore, the interference by 
the State can not be considered proportionate and supported by a legitimate aim.  
For this reason, any severe interference, such as the recourse to the imprisonment, must be 
based on strict control over the rights violated by journalists, which should be particularly severe; 
otherwise, the interference is only an attempt to break the legal provisions prescribed by the 
Convention. 
About France, where the Front National is gaining an even more widespread consensus 
among the electorate, and about the episode of the journalist forced to leave a political 
                                               
110 Cernusakova, “Poland’s Holocaust Law is a Dangerous Threat to Free Speech”.  
111 Cumpǎnǎ and Mazǎre v. Romania [GC], no. 33348/96, ECHR 2004-XI. 
112 Ibidem, §114. 
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conference, it is sufficient to recall the abovementioned unanimous case law of the Court113 on 
the matter of protecting the journalists in political debates. 
The attempt to remove journalists from public spaces must follow a rigorous and strict 
scrutiny, in particular in the events where they express their opinion on political issues, which 
engage the fundamental right of the citizens to receive the information even if critical or opposite, 
because a public interest is involved, and the free political debate is a very core concept of a 
democratic society; therefore, any attempt to erode this fundamental and primordial value is in 
violation of the scope and provisions of the Convention. 
Concerning the populist inclinations in Hungary, Serbia and particularly in Poland, it seems 
to be at stake, with a higher degree in Poland after the media reform law, the value of pluralism 
and independence of the media. 
First and foremost, it is important to emphasize what the Court clarified in the case of Fuentes 
Bobo v. Spain114 with the regard of State’s positive obligations; in fact, the State has a positive 
obligation to protect the right to freedom of expression against any interference and from even 
private individuals acts.  
Primary scope of the freedom of expression is the safeguard, promotion, and protection of the 
fundamental value of “pluralism”, the very essence of a democratic society, and any attempts to 
limit or restrict it must be interpreted in a rigorous and strict way according to the requisites 
prescribed by the legal provisions (prescribed by law, necessary in a democratic society, 
proportional) because otherwise the democratic asset itself could be reduced as well and, 
therefore, at stake.  
All the aforementioned international recommendations, guidelines and the Council of Europe 
standards have to be interpreted in this scope and precise meaning. 
As a consequence, the recent developments in Hungary, Serbia, and Poland seem to 
undermine the pluralistic and independent attitude that a democratic society must recognize to the 
media actors and, for that reason, now and shortly could arise several and problematic concerns 
of consistency with the European legal framework. 
On a final note, dealing with the matter of consistency with the Convention right of the so-
called “holocaust law” is a more complicated question, due to the fact that it touches on a really 
sensitive issue, a historical one, which the Court usually tends to leave to the margin of 
appreciation of the States for understandable reasons of precaution. 
As a preliminary matter, it is worth mentioning the object of protection under Article 10 of 
the Convention, which according to the polar case Handyside v. the United Kingdom, should not 
be limited to information or neutral ideas, but also “to those that offend, shock or disturb the State 
or any sector of the population. Such are the demands of that pluralism, tolerance and 
broadmindedness without which there is no democratic society”115; however, the attribute of 
                                               
113 See, e.g., Pentikäinen v. Finland, op.cit.; Selmani and Ors v. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
op.cit.; Lingens v. Austria, op.cit.; Castells v. Spain, op.cit.  
114 Fuentes Bobo v. Spain, op.cit, §38. 
115 Handyside v. United Kingdom, op.cit., §49. 
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offending, shocking or disturbing must not reach the qualification of “hate speech,” otherwise, 
the right cannot be claimed. 
The Court has already dealt with cases concerning the Holocaust116 but those regarding the 
offense of denying it in its entirety, as in the cases of Garaudy v. France117 and M’Bala M’Bala 
v. France118, where the Court started its reasoning with the clarification that it is forbidden to 
abuse of the rights prescribed by the Convention according to Article 17, because denying a 
historical facts could undermine the value of the fight against anti-Semitism that could pose a 
serious threat to the public order. In particular, the Court stated, in the first case, that the 
application was to be considered inadmissible because denying the Holocaust is equivalent to 
denying crimes against humanity and, therefore, was one of the most serious forms of racial 
defamation of Jews as well as incitement to hatred of them; in the second case, the Court 
emphasized that the denial could provide a platform for an ideology contrary to the values of the 
European Convention and, therefore, “the applicant has attempted to deflect Article 10 from its 
real purpose by seeking to use his right to freedom of expression for ends which are contrary to 
the text and spirit of the Convention and which, if admitted, would contribute to the destruction 
of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention”119. 
As a result, it appears that the potential violation of freedom of expression could be 
underlined as follows: if the declaration of the involvement of Poland in Nazi crimes could be 
qualified as a denial of the Holocaust, then, a violation of the right of freedom of expression 
could emerge on the floor, on the contrary, if the involvement does not reach the “denial 
threshold” a violation could not occur. 
 
2.1.5 The enforcement of the right 
 
The enforcement mechanisms to implement the effects of the European legal provisions relies 
mainly on the role assigned to the European Court of Human Rights, which is the judicial body of 
the European Convention on Human Rights. 
However, according to the principle of subsidiarity, the main actors that should play a central 
role in enforcing the decision of the Court are the States Parties that have to comply and 
implement the judgments by amending national laws or developing positive practices, as well as 
respect the penalties disposed of by the decisions. 
The scenario became even more complex in relation to populist parties and States in which 
populist parties are in power for the apparent reason that, as previously pointed out, populism 
takes their force, among other things, on discredit and oppose the international order, including 
the international tribunals; therefore, populist actors intentionally and willingly do not want to 
comply to the rules given from abroad their borders. 
                                               
116 See, Lobba, “Holocaust denial before the European Court of Human Rights: evolution of an exceptional regime”. 
117 Garaudy v. France (dec.), no. 65831/01, ECHR 2003-IX (extracts). 
118 Dieudonné M’Bala M’Bala v. France (dec.), no. 25239/13 (ECHR, 20 October 2015) 
119 Ibidem, §41 
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An example could clarify better the complexity of the matter, the recent decision No. 22/2016 
(XII.6.) held by the Hungarian Constitutional Court120 on the questionable subject of the share of 
refugee quota, where the Supreme Hungarian Court declared that Hungary’s constitutional 
identity is rooted in its alleged historical traditions and fundamental values recognized merely by 
the Fundamental Law and, therefore, the constitutional identity cannot be waived by way of an 
international treaty because Hungary can be deprived of its constitutional identity only through 
the final end of its sovereignty, its independent statehood; therefore, the protection of 
constitutional identity shall remain the duty of the Constitutional Court as long as Hungary is a 
sovereign State121. 
As a consequence, the enforcement could follow two different and antithetical directions; a 
strong one, by mean of imposing exceptional sanctions on a Member States or, a light and 
collaborative one, by proposing or recommending measures through the soft law instruments as a 
means to persuade States to comply with the European Convention on Human Rights. 
Preliminary, it is important to underline that media freedom and pluralism of media outlets 
are rights enshrined in the European Charter of Fundamental Rights and the European 
Convention on Human Rights, and, therefore, they become relevant as part of the Copenhagen 
criteria for gain the EU membership in terms of respect of democracy and human rights. 
The issue of media freedom, in fact, is an essential challenge for any country that aspires to 
join the EU community, not only because freedom of the press is a fundamental right and one of 
the values of the European Union, but also because freedom of the media is considered a clear 
indicator of a country’s democracy and rule of law; the media play a pivotal role in the 
functioning of democracy in providing the right information, creating transparency and making 
the public “the supervisor” of the work of the government and political institutions, in particular 
by fulfilling the role of journalism as a “watchdog” and, above all, through what is called 
investigative journalism122. 
The first one rely on the interpretation of Article 7 TEU123, which aims to ensure that an 
European State respects the shared values of the EU and could be activated only in cases of “clear 
risk of a serious breach” or “serious and persistent breach by a Member States” with the 
consequence that if a serious breach is proved the Council may decide to suspend individual 
rights deriving from the application of the Treaties to the Member States, including the right to 
vote124. 
However, it is desirable to pursue by other instruments, less intrusive and more inclusive, the 
way forward. 
For example, the Court in the case of Manole and Others v. Moldova, recall the attention on a 
number of reports presented by the Council of Europe, the OSCE and the Moldovan Centre for 
                                               
120 See, Decision 22/2016 (XII.5), AB on the Interpretation of Article E) (2) of the Fundamental Law (Const. Ct. 
Hung. Nov. 30, 2016). 
121 Cf. Furedi, Populism and the European Culture Wars, The Conflict of Values between Hungary and the EU, p. 68. 
122 Hoti and Gërguri, “Media Freedom, a challenge in Kosovo’s European Integration Process,” p. 30. 
123 Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, Article 7 (ex Article 7 TEU), OJ C 326, 26.10.2012, p. 
19–20. 
124 This mechanism was used in relation to Poland and there is a draft of the European Parliament in relation to 
Hungary, both refer to the rule of law and judicial independence issues. 
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Independent Journalism (IJC) on the issue of the guarantee of media pluralism and independence, 
the Committee of Ministers has published a conspicuous number of recommendations, and 
amongst them, it could be meaningful to recall the Recommendations of 1996 and 2007125.  
The first of the two, after affirming in the preamble that “the independence of the media, 
including broadcasting, is essential for the functioning of a democratic society and stressing the 
importance which it attaches to respect for media independence, especially by governments”126, 
provides various guidelines on the guarantee of the independence of public service broadcasting, 
including the role of the boards of management and their responsibilities, competences of 
supervisory bodies of public service broadcasting organisations, rules on funding of public 
services broadcasting and the programming policy. 
The Recommendation of 2007127, instead, addresses the issue of media pluralism and 
diversity of media content. In its preamble, interestingly, made a reference to the importance of 
the Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights that should be respected “only if 
each person is given the possibility to form his or her own opinion from diverse sources of 
information”128 and, as a result prescribes several recommendations to States for promoting 
structural pluralism of the media, limiting the influence of a single person, guaranteeing specific 
ownership regulations and raising awareness of the role of media in the society. 
Furthermore, the Resolution number 1535 of 2007 issued by the Council of Europe on the 
Threats to the lives and freedom of expression of journalists129, where after recalling the 
overriding importance of the freedom of expression, which “includes the right to express political 
opinions and criticize the authorities and society, expose governmental mistakes, corruption and 
organized crime, and question religious dogmas and practices” because “Freedom of expression 
is one of the cornerstones of democracy in Europe”; addressed the national parliaments of a 
twofold recommendation, consisting in:“10.1. Closely monitor the progress of such criminal 
investigations and hold the authorities accountable for any failures to investigate or prosecute; for 
example, the Russian Parliament as regards the murder of Anna Politkovskaya; 10.2. Abolish 
laws which place disproportionate limits on freedom of expression and are liable to be abused to 
incite extreme nationalism and intolerance; for example, the Turkish Parliament as regards 
Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code on the denigration of Turkishness”130. 
On the issue of “media pluralism,” the European Parliament also raised its concerns by 
                                               
125 Ibidem, §77, p. 52-53; see also, Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, Recommendation 10 on the 
guarantee of the independence of public service broadcasting (1996) and Recommendation (2007) 2 on media 
pluralism and diversity of media content, 31 January 2007.  
126 Recommendation No. R (1996), supra note 125, p. 6. 
127 Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, Recommendation CM/Rec (2007)2 on media pluralism and diversity 
of media content (2007). 
128 Ibidem, preamble. 
129 Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 1535, Threats to the lives and freedom of expression of 
journalists (2007). 
130 Ibidem, §10. 
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repeatedly referring131, most recently in its resolution of 21 May 2013, to the Commission’s 
awareness of proposing concrete measures to safeguard media pluralism, including a legislative 
framework for media ownership rules introducing minimum standards for the Member States. In 
particular, it expresses concern about the lack of transparency in media ownership in Europe and 
calls on the Commission and Member States to require media to submit to various actors, 
including national media authorities, company registers and public, accurate and up-to-date 
ownership information so as to allow identification of the beneficial and ultimate owners and co-
owners of media outlets suggesting, at the same time, to follow the model of the Mavise database.  
The Parliament, in more details, has addressed to the Commission the need of proposing new 
legally binding procedures and mechanisms to safeguard media pluralism, including ensuring that 
the Member States guarantee proper implementation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, 
concrete measures to prevent excessive media concentration and a legislative framework on 
media ownership rules introducing minimum standards for the Member States. Furthermore, it 
suggests to make up an instrument to ensure that the Member States invite the media sector to 
develop professional standards and ethical codes. 
Similarly, the European Parliament in its last Resolution of 10 June 2015132 on the general 
situation in Hungary called for the annual monitoring of compliance with democratic values, the 
rule of law and the fundamental rights in all the EU Member States through a Scoreboard; the 
latter was discussed on a study of 2016133 submitted to the European Parliament which proposed 
to establish an “EU Rule of Law Commission” as an independent body of scholars called upon to 
carry out a specific assessment of the democratic context in the light of available data or calls for 
extra information and draw up an Annual Report on the evolution of the status of the media 
actors; if the EU Rule of Law Commission establishes that there are systematic deficiencies or 
weaknesses, consideration could be given to asking the European Court of Justice to intervene 
and conduct a substantive assessment.   
Another initiative managed by the European Parliament and the Commission, the Media 
Pluralism Monitor (MPM), conducted by the Centre for Media Pluralism and Media Freedom at 
the European University Institute, appears to be useful for the development of new strategies on 
the subject matter, in which the data are collected scientifically and transparently, and the reports 
include quantitative section that shows trends and demonstrating the effects of policy decisions 
and a qualitative analytical section. 
Furthermore, the concentration of media ownership has been identified as a major concern in 
terms of media pluralism based on the motto “A free and pluralistic media landscape can sustain 
European democracy” by the High-level Group on Media Freedom and Pluralism, a group 
established in October 2011 with a mandate to draw up reports to be presented to the 
Commission for the respect, protection, support and promotion of pluralism and freedom of the 
                                               
131 See, e.g. European Parliament, Resolution of 21 May 2013 on the EU Charter:standard settings for media freedom 
across the EU; European Parliament, Draft Report on media pluralism and media freedom in the European 
Union; European Parliament, Media pluralism and media freedom in the European Union (procedure). 
132 European Parliament, Resolution of 10 June on the situation in Hungary.  
133 Bàrd, Carrera, Guild and Kochenov, “An EU mechanism on Democracy, the Rule of Law and Fundamental 
Rights”. 
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media in Europe. 
On 21 January 2013, the High Level Group presented its final report134 to the Commission, 
which, emphasized, first of all, that a free and pluralist media environment must be a pre-
condition for EU membership, contains around 30 recommendations addressed to both national 
and supranational authorities with the aim of improving the role, firstly, of the EU in terms of 
competences and harmonization of EU legislation and with the purpose of designating a 
European fundamental rights agency as a monitoring role of national-level freedom and pluralism 
of the media.; and secondly within the national legal frameworks starting to teaching from the 
high-school level the importance of the media. 
 
 
 
 
2.2 Attempts to limit freedom of association and assembly 
2.2.1 European legal basis 
 
The main provisions that define “freedom of association and assembly” within the European 
framework are the European Convention on Human Rights and the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights. 
Both freedoms are included in the Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights, 
which reads as follows: 
“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association 
with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his 
interests.  
2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are 
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national 
security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of 
health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This Article 
shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by 
members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the State.”135  
The freedoms prescribed in Article 11 are intimately linked to democracy and democratic 
values and, the Court stressed out in several judgments the importance of safeguarding the 
minorities also by way of promoting the associations amongst individuals, for example, it 
                                               
134 European Commission, High Level Group on Media Freedom and Pluralism. A free and pluralistic media to 
sustain European democracy (2013). 
135 Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(European Convention on Human Rights, as Amended) (ECHR), Art. 11, 1950; likewise the EU Charther of 
Fundamental Rights, in the Article 12 provides:“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and 
to freedom of association at all levels, particular in political, trade union and civic matters, which implies the 
right of everyone to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his or her interests;2. Political parties at 
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declared that “individual interests must on occasion be subordinated to those of a group, 
democracy does not simply mean that the views of a majority should always prevail: a balance 
must be achieved which ensures the fair and proper treatment of minorities and avoids any abuse 
of dominant position”136; therefore, the importance of this specific right is due to a pluralistic 
essence of the contemporary societies that must create appropriate conditions enabling the 
expression and the development of the identity of the individuals.  
A feature of the right to freedom of assembly and association is its close relationship with 
the right to freedom of expression, for the reason that expresses an opinion should be guaranteed 
and protected even on a more collective level; therefore, one of the scopes of the provision is to 
protect the expression of opinion, including protest and dissenting opinion (crucial on democratic 
societies). 
For instance, in the case Eva Molnàr v. Hungary, the Court stated that “The Court also 
emphasizes that one of the aims of freedom of assembly is to secure a forum for public debate 
and the open expression of protest. The protection of the expression of personal opinions, secured 
by Article 10, is one of the objectives of the freedom of peaceful assembly enshrined in Article 
11”137. 
As we can see, paragraph 2 of Article 11 contains a truly vague list of conditions that may 
potentially allow for the limitation, restriction or prohibition the right of freedom of association 
and assembly; therefore, an interference by the State to be considered lawful should respect the 
following parameters (similarly to the freedom of expression): prescribed by law, necessary in a 
democratic society, pursue the interests of national security or public safety; pursue to prevent a 
disorder or crime; pursue to protect health, morals or the right of others. 
For that reason, it is essential to stress out that the right enshrined in Article 11 could not be 
interpreted as an absolute right; however, the restrictions on the exercise of the right, according to 
the interpretation of the European Court of Human Rights must be interpreted narrowly and in a 
restrictive way, with only convincing and compelling reasons being able to justify them because 
the right involves the fundamental democratic values, indeed, the Court confirmed this uniform 
interpretation in several cases submitted to its jurisdiction138. 
Preliminarily, any restrictions, in the same way of the other rights, must be prescribed by 
law, the latter is interpreted in a very broad and manifold meaning, if the Court determines that 
there is no legal prescription for a restriction, it will conclude that there has been a breach of 
Article 11 without further consideration of the other requirements. 
Afterwards, the Court must take into account the second component consisting in the 
existence of a legitimate aim pursue one of the listed conditions, first of all, national security or 
public safety, in which the Court has been strict in admitting139, then the concept of prevention of 
disorder and crime and finally the other circumstances of the protection of health, morals or right 
                                               
136 Chassagnou and Others v. France [GC], nos 25088/94 and 2 others, §112, ECHR 1999-III  
137 Éva Molnár v. Hungary, no. 10346/05, §42, 7 October 2008. 
138 See, i.a. The United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden – PIRIN and Others v. Bulgaria (no. 2), nos. 41561/07 and 
20972/08, 18 October 2011; The United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden and Ivanov v. Bulgaria (no. 2), no. 
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and freedoms of the others. 
For example, in the case of Vona v Hungary, the Court held that the freedom of association 
and assembly could be limited to protect the rights of minorities.  
In its judgement, the Court found that the dissolution of the Hungarian Guard Association 
(Magyar Garda) by domestic courts was a lawful and legitimate restriction of the applicant’s 
rights under Article 11 of the Convention on the basis that the activities of the Movement, which 
include paramilitary operations in several villages of the Roma population, has violated their 
fundamental rights; therefore, the Hungarian authorities had the right to take preventive measures 
to protect democracy and to ban the activity of the association. 
Lastly, the Court has to deal with the requisite of “necessity in a democratic society”; 
however, first of all, should be met the condition of the pressing social need in which the national 
authorities have a priority assessment but always under the supervision of the Court; after that the 
reasons given by the local authorities must be “relevant and sufficient”, that is a condition under 
which the States must “applied standards which were in conformity with the principles embodied 
in Article 11 and, moreover, that they based their decision on an acceptable assessment of the 
relevant facts”140; furthermore, the Court should determine in assessing properly the 
proportionality if there could exist a chance of “effective and less intrusive measures”141 and, 
lastly and most significantly, in evaluating the proportionality test, the nature and severity of the 
sanctions imposed are important factors to be considered; for instance, a dissolution of an 
association is a drastic measure that could fail the proportionality test142.  
If the Court acknowledges the existence in the case of these requirements, it should allow 
the States to perform the interference within a certain margin of appreciation, especially in the 
sensitive matters or in issues where there is no consensus. 
Furthermore, and most importantly, from that right arise the obligation for the States party 
to perform such rights by means of positive obligation. 
Indeed, as the Court pointed out, “although the essential object of Article 11 is to protect the 
individual against arbitrary interference by public authorities with the exercise of the rights 
protected, there may be, in addition, positive obligations on the State to secure the effective 
enjoyment of such rights”143; furthermore, and most importantly, the positive obligations of the 
State reach a particular level of relevance when a right of minority groups is at stake, in this sense 
the Court added that “particular importance for persons holding unpopular views or belonging to 
minorities, because they are more vulnerable to victimization”144, such as cases involving 
demonstration concerning Lgbt rights145 and national minorities in general. 
 
 
                                               
140 Partidul Comunistilor (Nepeceristi) and Ungureanu v. Romania, no. 46626/99, §49, ECHR 2005-I. 
141 Schwabe and M.G. v. Germany, nos. 8080/08 and 8577/08, §118, ECHR 2011 (extracts) 
142 Biblical Centre of the Chuvash Republic v. Russia, no. 33203/08, §60, 12 June 2014. 
143 Demir and Baykara v. Turkey [GC], no. 34503/97, §42, ECHR 2008. 
144 Bączkowski and Others v. Poland, no. 1543/06, §64, 3 May 2007. 
145 See, e.g., Stankov and the United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden v. Bulgaria, nos. 29221/95 and 29225/95, 
ECHR 2001-IX. 
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2.2.2 Freedom of association and NGOs 
The existence and the promotion of the civil society and, more in particular, of non-
governmental organizations, is vital for a democratic society; as it was already mentioned NGOs 
could play, along the media outlets, a role of “watchdogs” over specific social issues and 
fostering positive changes within the social and political contexts.  
One of the primary debate that the European Court of Human Rights was called to address 
concerned the legal personality of the associations, which, firstly, should be facilitated in the 
administrative process by the national authorities and, secondly, it can not be considered 
discriminatory in order to access to the protection prescribed by the European Convention on 
Human Rights. 
A typical interference is the one concerning issue on registration of the association; therefore, 
for instance, a refusal of national authorities to recognize an association as a legal entity could be 
seen as interference, similarly, is interference when the government imposed further and 
additional administrative requirements for the registration. 
The fundamental importance of acquire legal personality in order to exercise properly the 
associational rights was highlighted in several cases by the Court, which declared that “The most 
important aspect of the right to freedom of association is that citizens should be able to create a 
legal entity in order to act collectively in a field of mutual interest; without this, that right would 
have no practical meaning”146; however, legal personality can be refused where the applicants fail 
to comply with a legal requirement that is compatible with the European Convention147 or in 
other exceptional circumstances such as when the name of the association belonged to others or 
could be easily confused or in some way could generate a misleading to the public148. 
In Sideropoulous v. Greece149 the applicants lodged an application against Greece based on 
its refusal to allow the registration of a non-profit association, Home of Macedonian Civilisation; 
the Greek courts had justified the refusal on the grounds that the purpose of the use of the term 
“Macedonian” was to challenge the Greek identity of Macedonia and its inhabitants and from 
which they drew an intention on the part of the organisation’s founders to undermine the 
territorial integrity of Greece150. The ECtHR found a violation of the Article 11 and stated in its 
judgment that: “Territorial integrity, national security and public order were not threatened by the 
activities of an association whose aim was to promote a region’s culture, even supposing that it 
also aimed partly to promote the culture of a minority; the existence of minorities and different 
cultures in a country was a historical fact that a “democratic society” had to tolerate and even 
protect and support according to the principles of international law”151. 
Given the importance of legal personality for the pursuit of common objectives, the Court 
concluded that the refusal to register the applicants’ association, with the result that it was denied 
even legal personality, was an apparent interference with freedom of association. 
                                               
146 See, Sidiropoulos and Others v. Greece, 10 July 1998, §40, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-IV. 
147 W.P. and Others v. Poland (dec.), no. 42264/98, ECHR 2004-VII (extracts), p. 9. 
148 Gorzelik and Others v. Poland [GC], no. 44158/98, §103, ECHR 2004-I. 
149 Sidiropoulos and Others v. Greece, op.cit., supra note 146. 
150 See on this issue, Kyriakou, Minority participation in public life: The Case of Greece.  
151 Sidiropoulos and Others v. Greece, op.cit. supra note 146, §41. 
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In the case of National Turkish Union v. Bulgaria152, in 2006 Mr. Kungyun announced his 
intention to form an association dedicated to promoting the rights of the Muslim minority in 
Bulgaria, the Regional Court refused the registration of the association on the ground that “the 
development of political pluralism with a view to the democratization and demonopolization of 
the Turkish community” was political in nature and not allowed to being aimed by non political 
party.  
It also observed that the primary aims of a non-profit association could not include 
commercial activities. 
The Court judgement was the following, noted, firstly, that freedom of association is not 
absolute, and States had the right to control the conformity of the purpose and activities of an 
association with the rules laid down by law, but that right had to be exercised in a manner 
consistent with obligation under the Convention and subject to the control of the treaty bodies, 
consequently, the exceptions under Article 11 had to be interpreted strictly and the interference 
was in any event not necessary in a democratic society. 
The Court had already held in previous cases against Bulgaria (Cf. United Macedonian 
Organization Ilindend and Others v Bulgaria, 2006153 and Zechev v. Bulgaria, 2007154) that the 
political nature of the aims of an association could not justify a refusal to register. 
In Zechev v. Bulgaria, more in details, the fact that an NGO’s objectives might be seen as 
“political” should not necessitate it seeking the status of a political party; therefore, for these 
reasons the Court found a violation of Article 11 of the Convention because a refusal of NGO 
registration was not allowed by any grounds, there were no pressing social need, proportion, and 
necessity in a democratic society155. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
152 National Turkish Union Kungyun v. Bulgaria, no. 4776/08, 8 June 2017; See, moreover, Cranmer, "Another 
registration case: National Turkish Union v Bulgaria." 
153 The United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden - PIRIN and Others v. Bulgaria (No. 2), op.cit., supra note 138. 
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2.2.3 Populist threats 
In some Member States of the Council of Europe there is currently a growing tendency to 
limit the activities of NGOs through the introduction of restrictive legal frameworks and the 
running of defamation campaigns with a view to stifling any form of criticism156, the NGOs most 
frequently affected by these restrictions are those that carry out activities in the field of human 
rights protection or promotion157. 
In this regard, the main populist threat could be the reform presented by the populist party 
Fidesz in Hungary known as “Stop Soros.”  
The legislative draft, which could pass in the next few months after the re-election of the 
populist leader Viktor Orbán, clearly addresses these branches of civil society and, in particular, 
the NGOs actors, imposing additional administrative requirements for their official registration 
and a 25% tax for NGOs who receive funding from abroad158.  
In particular, the so-called “Stop Soros bill”, presented to the Hungarian parliament by 
Fidesz, is divided into three main points: first, all NGOs that are accused or only suspected to 
support illegal immigration routes need to be registered and must submit data on their overall 
activities; secondly, if an NGO receives funding from abroad, it must pay 25% of taxes to the 
Hungarian government and, finally, foreign citizens and Hungarian activists who support illegal 
immigration may be subject to a restraining order which would keep them away from the 
border159. 
An impressive number of international actors, for instance, the Expert Council on NGO 
Law160, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe161, the European Parliament162, the 
Venice Commission163, the European Commission164 have shown their concerns on the 
substantive rights potentially threatened by the new reform pushed by Fidesz. 
The Special Commissioner for Human Rights, Janos Lazar, after a visit in Hungary regarding 
the monitoring of the situation of non-governmental organisations and after a considerable 
number of audits, 58 NGOs beneficiaries from the Norwegian Civil Fund (the so-called NGO 
Fund), carried out by the Hungarian Government Control Office (Kormanyzati Ellenorzesi 
Hivatal), in a letter addressed to the Hungarian government expressed all of his doubts on the 
                                               
156 See, OBS (The Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders). Violations of the right of NGOs to 
funding: from harassment to criminalization. 
157 See, Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Report on 
How to prevent inappropriate restrictions on NGO activities in Europe (2014). 
158 Hungarian Helsinki Committee, Short Analysis of the Proposed Hungarian Bill on Foreign Funded Non-
Governmental Organizations. 
159 RT, “Stop Soros: Hungary’s plan to curb pro-immigration NGOs explained”. 
160 Council of Europe, Conference of INGOs of the Council of Europe. Opinion on the Hungarian Draft Act on the 
Transparency of Organisations supported from abroad.  
161 Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 2162, Alarming developments in Hungary: draft NGO 
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reform, stating that: “NGOs play a central role in a democratic society. They should be able to 
pursue their public watchdog function in an environment conducive to their work, without undue 
interference in their internal functioning, unless there are objective reasons for doing so and the 
stigmatizing rhetoric used in that context, with politicians questioning the legitimacy of NGO 
work, is of great concern to me”165.   
Likewise, many reports presented by the United Nations Special Rapporteurs expressed 
concerns on the Hungarian development; for instance, the report on “Comparative study of 
enabling environments for association and businesses,”166where the Special Rapporteur, Maina 
Kiai, argues in favor of “sectorial equity,” which it means a fair, transparent and impartial 
approach to regulating each sector.  
More specifically, in this report was pointed out that “There is no basis in international 
human rights law for imposing more burdensome auditing and reporting requirements upon 
associations than for businesses. Justification such as protecting State sovereignty or ensuring aid 
effectiveness are not legitimate bases under the ICCPR. Even legitimate interests, such as 
protecting national security, can’t be used to justify excessive intrusion. Restrictions on 
association rights must be based on individualized and identifiable suspicion, not a pre-emptive 
suspicion of an entire sector. Most importantly, States can only impose restrictions that are 
prescribed by law, and necessary and proportionate to the aim pursued.”167 
Germany’s Europe minister, Michael Roth, also expressed his concern about the Hungarian 
reform by stating that “A common European Union commits us to respect and protect all four 
fundamental freedoms beyond borders. Only with a vibrant and critical civil society can we 
maintain our common Europe of values, the bill submitted by the Hungarian Government in 
parliament make the work of civil society organizations difficult or even impossible”168; and also 
the Human Rights Commissioner at the Council of Europe, Nils Muiznieks, raised his worries on 
the reform that could further aggravate the situation of freedom of association in Hungary, due to 
the fact that NGOs that do not meet the new administrative requirements could be subject to 
sanctions and penalties, including a fine and ultimately the dissolution of the asset169. 
Another harsh criticism of the reform was presented by the Human Rights organization 
“Hungarian Helsinki Committee,”170 which expressed concerns based on several grounds and, 
more precisely regarding the proper guarantee of the freedom of association, exposed two main 
criticisms: 
- Firstly, the penalties imposed by the new law (fines between 10.000 – 900.000 HUF), 
which may lead to a procedure of termination or appointment of a trustee, are incredibly 
harsh, therefore not proportionate and to be considered as an unlawful restriction of 
                                               
165 Council of Europe, Commissioner for Human Rights. Report by Nils Muiznieks. 
166 United Nations, General Assembly. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful 
assembly and of association, A/70/266 (4 August 2015). 
167 Ibidem. 
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freedom of association that would not satisfy the Court standards of legitimate aim, 
pressing social need and proportionality171; 
 
- Secondly, the infringement of the general prohibition of discrimination about the freedom 
of association by discriminating NGOs by the sources of funding they receive, treating 
NGOs with legal personality differently from other entities without any reasonable 
justification and, excluding from the application other organizations, such as sports and 
religious organizations172. 
More recently, 14 Hungarian NGOs have submitted a complain to the European Court of 
Human Rights, which is still pending173, stressing out the importance of the Article 11 on the 
specific context of the reform, invoking that the freedom of assembly and association is highly 
compromised because, firstly, the administrative requirements imposed by the new law are too 
onerous and, secondly, for the reason that the penalties are to be considered as too severe and, 
therefore, having a chilling effect on the NGOs activities threatened in a non proportionate and 
justifiable way. 
After all, the draft proposal does not seem to be consistent with the right of freedom of 
assembly and association, established in Art. 11 of the Convention, by several grounds. 
First of all, the reform seems not to consider the cardinal role that NGOs, the same watchdog 
role as the media, should play in a democratic society because requiring additional administrative 
procedures express the desire of non-compliance with the positive obligations that a State must 
carry out in order to facilitate and promote the outcomes of civil society actors. 
Secondly, starting from the assumption that this reform is a classical example of 
“interference” by national authorities, several doubts may emerge with regard to the requirements 
of proportionality and necessity in a democratic society; in particular, the penalties seem to clash 
against the proportionality test (making, therefore, unnecessary to assess the additional condition 
of necessity in a democratic society) due to the nature and severity of the sanctions imposed 
which, as specified by the Court, should be the “less intrusive”174 one and, the severe amount of 
the fine prescribed but, above all, the penalty of the dissolution seems to be, on the contrary, the 
“most intrusive”. 
In truth, regarding the penalties of the dissolution, which following the case law of the 
Court175 constitutes an apparent interference with the right of association, it seems to be not 
proportionate and, most importantly, contrary to the previous standards introduced by the case 
law of the European Court of Human Rights. 
The European Court of Human Rights, in this meaning, has found that in order to consider a 
dissolution of an association as “proportionate and necessary in a democratic society, there must 
be no other means of achieving the same end that would interfere less seriously”176 and such a 
                                               
171 Ibidem, p. 4. 
172 Ibidem, p. 5. 
173 The Complaint was filed by 14 Hungarian NGOs to the European Court of Human Rights over the law on 
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“drastic measure requires very serious reasons by way of justification before it can be considered 
proportionate and warranted only in the most serious of cases”177. 
In fact, as already pointed by the Venice Commission178, the dissolution of an association 
should only be used as a measure of last resort in all the cases when the organization engages in 
serious misconduct or lends itself to bankruptcy or long-term inactivity179 and, furthermore, this 
is not the case of mere failure to respect specific legal requirements which the Court has already 
addressed in the case Tebieti Muhafize Cemiyyeti and Israilof v. Azerbaijan, when was stated that 
“a mere failure to respect certain legal requirements or internal management of non-governmental 
organisations cannot be considered such serious misconduct as to warrant outright 
dissolution”180. 
Furthermore, the penalty of the dissolution, as suggested by the Council of Europe 
Commissioner for Human Rights, Nils Muiznieks181, should be strictly limited to the three 
recognized by international standards: bankruptcy, prolonged inactivity, other serious misconduct 
and, so, not more. 
 
 
2.2.4 The enforcement of the right 
 
In the same way as other rights, the enforcement of the right of freedom of assembly faces 
many criticisms due to the tensions between populist parties in power and international 
institutions, but in any case, with regard to the specific right concerned, we can show an 
extraordinary example that could constitute the legal basis of the enforcement process which 
comes directly from the case law of the European Court of Human Rights; in fact, we are 
referring to the case of Baczkowski v. Poland182. 
The cited case represents a landmark decision for the rights of LGBT communities to exercise 
their freedom of assembly appropriately; the European Court of Human Rights condemned 
Poland for violating the right to assembly and other related rights emphasizing, in particular, the 
importance of pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness, meanwhile affirming the existence of a 
truly positive obligation of a State to secure genuine and effective respect for freedom of 
association and assembly. 
In this regard, the enforcement of the right to freedom of assembly must be achieved, 
principally, at the national level because there is a primary duty of a Member State involved; as a 
consequence, the Europea Convention on Human Rights should be enforced, first and foremost, 
through the proper exercise of positive obligations by the State. 
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State parties to the European Convention on Human Rights, amongst other things, are obliged 
to respect and enforce the provisions of the Convention, first of all, by the application of the 
general principle pacta sunt servanda and, at the same time, by Article 27 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties183 which states that “a State party may not invoke the 
provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.”184 
However, we must acknowledge the existence of a paradox that could lead to a real short-
circuit between the international actors involved; indeed, the presence of several problems limit 
the domestic legal impact which the judgements of the European Court of Human Rights might 
otherwise have185 because, firstly, there is “no obligation arising out of the Convention to make 
judgements of the ECtHR executable within the domestic legal system186 and, as the 
aforementioned case of the Hungarian Constitutional Court187 takes into the limelight of the 
international arena, many national courts do not accept that judgements of the Courts are binding, 
in the meaning of the enforcement of these judgments at national level. 
Furthermore, the Art. 46 of the Convention, which provides that “High Contracting Parties 
undertake to abide by the final judgment of the Court in any case to which they are parties” is 
interpreted in the meaning that each State is obliged to observe only those judgments pronounced 
directly against it and not others. 
This contrast is particularly meaningful in the Hungarian context188, where exists two 
antithetical paradigms: a positive one, rapresented by the Csullog judgment189, where after the 
decision of the Court, Hungary amended the criminal law in accordance with the findings of the 
European Court giving the right emphasis to the Article Q (2) of the Fundamental Law of 
Hungary which prescribed that “Hungary shall ensure the conformity between international law 
and Hungarian law in order to fulfil its obligation under international law”190and a negative one, 
which dates back to the case Franatolò191, in which the Hungarian Parliament explicitly declared 
its unwillingness to respect the judgment and as a consequence amends the criminal law. 
The recent trend, nevertheless, is the growing application of the Strasbourg jurisprudence for 
interpreting the Hungarian law correctly due to the role of civil society in preparing training and 
workshop on the importance of the ECHR findings on both the national and international 
order192. 
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In any case, States, as primary enforcement actors, should be more active in the development 
of positive practice within their borders, emphasizing the fundamental principle that the rights to 
freedom of peaceful assembly and association are due to everyone without distinction because 
this right plays a crucial role in promoting tolerance, broadmindedness, diversity, and pluralism 
in the societies and democratic assets; they need to draw a fine line in balancing the rights of 
various groups for ensuring that one group is not favoured, either in policy or practice and such 
freedom must, therefore, not only be protected but also facilitated in a practical way. 
Moreover, they need to establish or strengthen oversight mechanisms, for example through 
parliament or human rights institutions, to identify and deal with fundamentalist practices that 
restrict assembly and association rights and become less restrictive in regulating civil society and 
the rights to freedom of assembly and association, and recall that democracy, tolerance, and 
inclusiveness are among the most reliable indicators for long-term security, prosperity, and 
moderation. 
Lastly, the role of civil society and civic organizations should be promoted and facilitated by 
State policies, in order to create and expand initiatives to educate people, particularly youth, on 
the importance of pluralism, tolerance and diversity in democratic societies and research, monitor 
and document potential violations of the right in specific contexts, because strengthening the 
democracy as the best long-term strategy for countering extremism, as people are less likely to 
act upon extreme or violent views when they feel that they have a stake in their society193. 
 
2.3 Attempts to limit freedom of thought, conscience and religion 
2.3.1 European legal basis 
Among other substantive rights, one of the fundamental freedoms protected by the ECHR, is 
the freedom of thought, conscience and religion; the relevant European provision is Article 9 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights, which stated that: 
“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right 
includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in 
community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in 
worship, teaching, practice and observance” 
“2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations 
as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests or 
public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of 
the rights and freedom for others”194. 
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One of the main reasons why freedom of thought, conscience an religion was deemed to be 
a “fundamental and undisputed freedom”195 was due to the vulnerability of minority religious 
groups to having their human rights violated, evident in the persecution of the Jews196. 
The overriding importance of the right in question was spelled out, on several occasions, by 
the Court, which has raised up in this regard the prominence of the safeguard of principle of 
pluralism and pluralistic views within the society, “the pluralism indissociable from a democratic 
society, which has been dearly won over the centuries, depends on it”.197 
In fact, the European Court of Human Rights, in the case of Kokkinakis v. Greece, has 
clarified the ultimate scope of the article 9 which is “one of the foundations of a democratic 
society within the meaning of the Convention. It is, in its religious dimension, one of the most 
vital elements that go to make up the identity of believers and their conception of life, but it is 
also a precious asset for atheists, agnostics, sceptics and the unconcerned. The pluralism 
indissociable from a democratic society, which has been dearly won over the centuries, depends 
on it”.198 
First of all, in the freedom of thought, conscience and religion, as described in Article 9 of 
the Convention, there are three components in need of protection: the freedom of thought, 
conscience, and religion as such; the freedom to change one’s religion or belief; and the freedom 
to manifest religion or belief199.  
Article 9 (1) includes the positive scope of the article; it expressly includes the right to 
manifest one’s religion or belief in both private and public sphere; while the sphere of personal 
beliefs and religious creeds, or the forum internum, is free from restrictions, Article 9 (2) 
provides five broad grounds under in accordance with the freedom to manifest one’s religion 
(forum externum), may be legitimately restricted or limited200. 
However, even if the right as such seems to possess an absolute nature, as the Court stated 
when it declared that “States cannot dictate what a person believes or take coercive steps to make 
him changes his beliefs”201, it is mostly the third component that raises many concerns, for the 
predictable reason that manifest the religious belief may impact upon other people rights; 
therefore, paragraph 2 of Article 9 provides that the limitations are imposed by means of a 
formulation very similar to that of the previous articles of the Convention (Art. 8,10 and 11). 
However and, in contrast with the limitations clauses contained in the Articles 8, 10 and 11, 
this article does not recognize “national security” as a legitimate aim for doing an interference 
with the freedom to manifest religion or belief and this omission according to the Court, is “far 
from being an accidental one” because it “reflects the primordial importance of religious 
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pluralism as one of the foundations of a democratic society within the meaning of the Convention 
and the fact that a State cannot dictate what a person believes or take coercive steps to make him 
change his beliefs”202. 
The need to balancing the different rights was emphasized by the Court in several 
judgments when it declared that “In a democratic society, in which several religion coexist within 
one and the same population, it may be necessary to place restrictions on this freedom in order to 
reconcile the interests of the various groups and ensure that everyone’s beliefs are respected”.203 
As a consequence, and in the same way of the other discussed rights, the limitations must 
be: prescribed by law, based on a legitimate aim and necessary in a democratic society. 
Firstly, the interference must be prescribed by law, which means that should be authorized 
by a rule or order recognized in the national legal framework; the law in question could be a 
written law but even an unwritten one. However, and most importantly, there is also a qualitative 
requirement: the law must be accessible and foreseeable by the standard or ordinary role model. 
In effect, however, the words refer to the broad and general notion of the rule of law. 
Secondly, the interference should pursue a specific legitimate aim and this investigation, 
undoubtedly really problematic, concerns the enumeration of the purposes set out in paragraph 2, 
namely: the interests of public safety, the protection of public order, health, or morals, or the right 
of others. Anyway, it is important to emphasize that these restrictions are to be interpreted in a 
very narrow way.204 
In the aforementioned case Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, concerning the headscarf ban in a public 
university, the Court made a very superficial reference to the requisite of “public order” and “the 
rights and freedoms of others”, just noting that these requirements were not invoked, and so in 
dispute, by the applicants. 
In the French full-face veil or burqa case, the Government invoked the public safety as well 
as respect for the minimum set of values of an open and democratic society, explaining that the 
second ground was composed of three elements: “respect for equality between men and women, 
respect for human dignity, and respect for the minimum requirements of life in society,”205 the 
decision of the Court highlighted, in particular, the third element, when it said that could be 
linked in some way to the requirement of the “right and freedom of the others”. The latter was 
again emphasized by the Grand Chamber, which concluded that the interference was justified 
because of the “breaching of the right of others to live in a space of socialization which makes 
living together easier.”206 
Thirdly, the interference should respect the last demand concerning the necessity in a 
democratic society and not surprisingly most of the decisions of the Court involving this 
requirement; in making this final arduous assessment, the Court should decide for the appropriate 
balance between different rights at stake and consider, first of all, the necessity and the pressing 
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social need and, later, takes a further step on proportionality which involves the balancing of the 
individual rights with the interest of the society as a whole. 
For example, in the conversed case Lautsi and Others v. Italy207, concerning the applicant 
complained that the display of the crucifix in the State school attended by her children was in 
breach of Article 9, the Second Section of the Chamber, in the first judgment, began its reasoning 
stating that the State have a special duty to preserve and respect the pluralism in education, which 
is part of the contemporary democratic societies, indeed, it expressed that “cannot see how the 
display in state-school classrooms of a symbol that is reasonable to associate with Catholicism 
(the majority religion in Italy) could serve the educational pluralism which is essential for the 
preservation of democratic society within the Convention meaning of that term.”208  
Afterward, the Grand Chamber reversed this initial ruling and found no violation on the 
basis that the question of religious symbols in classrooms was, in principle, a matter falling 
within the margin of appreciation of the State, where there was no European consensus on it. 
Lastly, we should point out that in regard to this specific right the Court has not yet delivered 
any judgments which spelled out, in a clear and transparent way, that the States have positive 
obligations to protect the freedom of thought, conscience an religion, even if it has had the 
opportunity to do so, for example in the case of Vergos v. Greece209, where the national 
authorities were blamed for not having designated an area for the building of a house of prayer210 
and the Court acknowledged the margin of appreciation of Greece in balancing town an country 
planning policy objectives with religious need211. 
 
2.3.2 The ban on religious symbols 
In the international scenario, there have been many cases concerning clothing, head-covering, 
and jewelry212; in fact, even if International Courts have often emphasized the role of the State as 
a neutral and impartial organizer of public order, religious harmony, and tolerance in a 
democratic society, States often invoke concerns about health, safety and security in justifying 
measures that limit the use and the wearing of clothing with religious significance.   
A crucial factor in the judgments is the degree of showing: noting that “the value to an 
individual who has made religion a central tenet of his or her life to be able to communicate that 
belief to others”, the Court upheld the right of an airline employee to wear a “discrete” cross on a 
necklace in a context where other forms of religious manifestation, such as the wearing of a hijab 
or headscarf, had been accommodated213. However, it reached the opposite conclusion where the 
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applicant was a nurse working in a public hospital and where there were safety concerns about 
the wearing of any chain or necklace214. 
Concerning the correct interpretation of these legal provisions, it is necessary to investigate 
the relationship (and tensions) between the case law of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union and the European Court of Human Rights on the subject matter. 
The latter, expressed his view in several cases, for example in Leyla Sahin v. Turkey215, 
Dogru v. France216 and Dahlab v. Switzerland217. 
In Dahlab v. Switzerland, concerning a ban of the hijab dressed by a teacher in a public 
school, the Court considered the interference as a justified measure for the reason that the 
prohibition to wear a headscarf was not “directed at her as a member of the female sex but 
pursued the legitimate aim of ensuring the neutrality of the state primary-education system.”218 
In the case Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, concerned a university student who objected the rules on 
clothing of a Turkish state university, the Grand Chamber reaffirming the principle that wearing a 
headscarf is hard to reconcile with the principle of gender equality, tolerance, respect for others 
and non-discrimination, confirmed that “where questions concerning the relationship between 
state and religions are concerned, on which opinion in a democratic society may reasonably differ 
widely, the role of the national decision-making body must be given special importance,”219 
therefore, it left a wide margin of appreciation to the Turkish authorities to decide whether it 
should be considered as “necessary” in the concrete context.  
From these and similar judgments, it is interesting to note that the correct meaning of the 
findings reached is the preference to allowed national authorities to decide or assess the limits on 
religious manifestation according to their national context; therefore, this could mean that the 
European Court provides freedom of religion to say something fundamentally different between 
European countries220. 
On the same issue, the European Court of Justice delivered two twin judgments on 14th March 
2017221, one case from Belgium and one from France222. 
In the first case, the Court states that clothing worn for religious reasons is an intrinsic aspect 
of religious belief; afterward, it concludes that there was no any discrimination on the religious 
ground because the employer had a general ban of any exposure of religious or political belief of 
the personnel. 
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In the second case, the Court ruled that employers could not discriminate because of a 
customer request that the employees did not wear the headscarf, this was not a genuine request 
and capable of determining a further occupational requirement that could justify reserving a job 
to those who did not wear veils. 
In principle, the rulings of the Court imply that employers can prohibit employees from 
wearing a headscarf, but only in some instances; in the first place, cases only concern customer-
facing employees, on the rigid condition that the employer should pursue a non-discriminatory or 
'neutrality' policy.  
A policy of neutrality means that an employer must also prohibit other religious or political 
symbols worn by customer-oriented employees; however, on the same issue, the European Court 
of Human Rights, reached a different conclusion in the case of Eweida v United Kingdom223, a 
case concerned a dispute between British Airways and one employee which claim his right to 
wear a religious necklace while working.  
The Court which was called to balance the right to express the religious beliefs and the rights 
of the others, in particular, the right to maintaining a reputation on a corporate image found a 
violation of the Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights by the following 
reasoning:  
“It is clear, in the view of the Court, that these factors combined to mitigate the extent of 
the interference suffered by the applicant and must be taken into account. Moreover, in 
weighing the proportionality of the measures taken by a private company in respect of its 
employee, the national authorities, in particular the courts, operate within a margin of 
appreciation. Nonetheless, the Court has reached the conclusion in the present case that a 
fair balance was not struck. On one side of the scales was Ms Eweida’s desire to manifest 
her religious belief. As previously noted, this is a fundamental right: because a healthy 
democratic society needs to tolerate and sustain pluralism and diversity; but also because 
of the value to an individual who has made religion a central tenet of his or her life to be 
able to communicate that belief to others. On the other side of the scales was the 
employer’s wish to project a certain corporate image. The Court considers that, while this 
aim was undoubtedly legitimate, the domestic courts accorded it too much weight. Ms 
Eweida’s cross was discreet and cannot have detracted from her professional appearance. 
There was no evidence that the wearing of other, previously authorised, items of religious 
clothing, such as turbans and hijabs, by other employees, had any negative impact on 
British Airways’ brand or image. Moreover, the fact that the company was able to amend 
the uniform code to allow for the visible wearing of religious symbolic jewellery 
demonstrates that the earlier prohibition was not of crucial importance.”224 
The repercussions of this and similar judgments on dress code, veils, crucifixes in schools, 
and so on could be quite powerful across Europe. 
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2.3.3 Populist threats 
 
“Europe becomes more and more a province of Islam, a colony of Islam. And Italy is an 
outpost of that province, a stronghold of that colony, in each of our cities lies a second 
city: A Muslim city, a city run by the Quran. A stage in the Islamic expansionism”225 
 
As already mentioned, a threat, real and concrete, is the new tendency to hinder the 
freedom of religion through several and manifold measures: from the ban on wearing religious 
clothes to the prohibition of religious symbols in public spaces, to not allow the construction of 
new religious building (especially minarets), anti-Islam propaganda and constant spread of 
xenophobia sentiments amongst people, just to name a few. 
 
Anti-immigration sentiments, often based on cultural and new nationalist ideologies, have 
strengthened the popularity and the appeal of populist parties, especially throughout Europe. 
Nationalist parties in countries such as Austria, Denmark, Hungary, Switzerland, Italy, France, 
among others, have attracted significant support in the recent elections also because of their off-
limit electoral campaigns (in many cases, a real and frequent resort to the tool of hate speech); in 
Germany, for example, Frauke Petry, leader of the populist party Alternative for Germany (AfD), 
referred to a “drastic steps” to prevent Islamist ideology spreading in Germany, including a new 
ban on the construction of new minarets. She adds that Islam “does not belong to Germany,” 
even if Muslims who “practice their religion peacefully and privately can be good citizens.”226  
 
At the same time, in Italy, Matteo Salvini, the leader of the populist party North League, 
declared that “We are under attack. Our culture, society, traditions and way of life are at risk, the 
colour of one’s skin has nothing to do with it, but the risk is very real. Centuries of history risk 
disappearing if Islamization, which up until now has been underestimated, gains the upper 
hand”227. 
 
The anti-Muslim arguments are no longer limited to the margins of the society and are now 
also accepted by some mainstream politicians resulting in a growing xenophobic populist 
discourse. Islamophobia manifests itself through individual attitudes as well as the policies and 
practices of institutions which vary among member states and over time. Hostility, fear, hatred of 
Islam and active discrimination against individuals of this faith often appear through hate speech, 
violence or ethnic and religious profiling; Muslims, in particular, continue to experience 
discrimination in various areas of social life and data from most countries suggest that Muslim 
women wearing visible religious symbols, such as the headscarf, are particularly vulnerable to 
discrimination due to the intersectionality of gender and religion and this often results in undue 
restrictions affecting their lives and such negative experiences, as suggested by the annual report 
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of the Council of Europe, can fuel feelings of isolation within a broader community and hinder 
inclusive societies228. 
 
But primarily, this widespread tendency shows, first of all, that the most common populist 
method used to erode or try to do it, the credibility of the “others group” is the hate speech, in 
other words, a misuse of the rights derived from the abuse of freedom of expression; in reality, 
populist leaders use their harsh anti-religious rhetoric only for personal gain, which could be an 
increase in voters in the general elections or the objective of influencing the electorate in order to 
obtain a more widespread consensus for future legal reforms, often characterized by more than 
dubious legal grounds, such as the case occurred in Switzerland. 
 
In Switzerland, in the speech before a referendum, concerning the ultimate ban on the 
construction of new minarets, the president of the local branch of the Young Swiss People’s 
Party, the Populist Party of Switzerland, emphasized that it was time to stop the expansion of 
Islam and the prohibition of minarets, would be an expression of the preservation of one’s own 
identity; the referendum, which passed with a clear majority of voters, 57.5 percent of the voters 
in 22 of Switzerland’s 25 cantons, in this meaning was an excellent victory for the populist 
political forces but, at the same time, it raises many concerns on the respect and consistency with 
the fundamental right of the freedom of religion.  
 
The Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, Ms. Asma Jahangir, the 
following day after the outcome raised up her deep concerns, calling the Swiss authorities to 
abide by all its international obligations an to take all the necessary measures to adequately 
protect the right to freedom of religion amongst the members of the Muslim community because 
the ban on minarets amounted to an undue restriction of the freedom to manifest one’s belief in a 
democratic context229. 
 
On the one hand the Swiss Green Party want to challenge the referendum at the Strasbourg 
Court for violating the freedom of religion230, simultaneously a private citizen, Hafid Ouardiri, on 
December 15, 2009 lodged a complaint231 to the European Court of Human Rights, claiming that 
the constitutional amendment in Switzerland prohibiting the building of minarets would amount 
to a violation of the European Convention on Human Rights and especially on the breach of the 
right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion as enshrined in the Article 9 of the 
Convention; however, the Court, surprisingly, concerning the ban, were deemed inadmissible on 
the ground that the applicant could not claim to be the “victims,” neither direct or indirect, of a 
violation of the Convention. 
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It is interesting to notice the arguments according to which two organizations, Open Society 
Foundation232 and ECLJ233, intervened as a third party in the case mentioned above have 
proposed to the attention of the Court. 
 
The European Centre for Law & Justice, more specifically, in a note234, raised its concerns 
on a more broader perspective concerning the crisis that religious freedom undergoes. 
First and foremost, they reaffirmed that the real essence of the freedom of religion, in accordance 
with the relevant case-law of the Court, is to support a pluralistic, tolerant and multicultural 
approach and the recognition of the principle of “neutrality” that State must achieve to avoid any 
discrimination; secondly, they pointed out on the fact that the idea of secularization of a 
European public space is actually foreign to the spirit of the Council of Europe and that such 
approach could be a failure or even a betrayal of the European values. 
 
Therefore, they concluded that the new tendencies shown by the cases of the Swiss 
referendum and the banning of Islamic headscarves, amounts to a disavowal of the pluralistic, 
tolerant and multicultural conception of religious freedom that could lead to the paradox of 
protecting religious freedom by a social elimination of the others, of other religious groups, of 
minority groups. 
 
It remains to be seen how the Court, once the admissibility criteria are fulfilled, might 
decide on the merits of an application against the Swiss ban on the construction of minarets. 
Lastly, in order to determine if the Swiss ban could be considered as consistent with the 
current European framework in terms of respecting freedom of religion, it is important to noting 
that the Court in the case Manoussakis and Others v. Greece235, pointed out that the margin of 
appreciation of the national authorities in order to assess whether there is a real need for the 
religious community to set up a religious building, in this case, was a church, is not a wider one 
and, therefore, the interference was delineated as illegitimate because was not met the 
requirement of necessity in a democratic society. 
Several doubts in terms of consistency could arise, first of all, with regard to the proper 
exercise of positive obligations by States to protect the freedom of thought, conscience an 
religion, and in particular, to guarantee an effective reliogous pluralism within a democratic 
society as stated by the Court in the case of Vergos v. Greece236; secondly, in relation to the 
requirements of proportionality and necessity in a democratic society due to the fact that a ban on 
the building of minarets could be considered as the most intrusive interference performed by 
national authorities and, as a result, should be pursued as extrema ratio. 
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Another potential threat is the emerging legal tendency to ban the hijab or other religious 
clothes, such as in Austria, France, Netherlands237; and many others European States238. 
 
Almost all the mentioned reforms are implemented to prevent the danger to the safety of 
people and property, to fight identity fraud and to promote the principle of gender equality239 in 
order to ensure a peaceful “living together” through “the observance of the minimum 
requirements of life in society”240, the latter refers evidently to the textual exception of the rights 
of the others. 
 
Several doubts could arise, in particular, with reference to the requirement of 
proportionality241. 
 
The Court in a previous judgment242, stressed the role of national authorities in protecting 
the values of pluralism, tolerance, and broadmindedness, which should intend “not to remove the 
cause of tension by eliminating pluralism, but to ensure that the competing groups tolerate each 
other”; religious dressing codes, such as burqa or hijab, could be considered as a frame in order to 
express the personality and beliefs of a minority group, such as the Muslim women and, 
therefore, the legislative prohibition could be interpreted as a sign of “selective pluralism and 
restricted tolerance”243. 
  
Moreover, as the dissenting opinion of the judges Nussberger and Jaderblom underlined244, 
those legal reforms, apparently supported by the purpose of reducing gender differences and 
discriminations, could lead to an evident and worrying dilemma245: women wishing to wear a 
full-face veil in accordance with their religious faith or culture could be forced to break with their 
traditions and as a result they could face not only criminal sanctions, but also the familiar 
reactions with the paradox that it can not be claimed that the restrictive measure has the desired 
effect of liberating women oppressed, but could exclude them from society and aggravate their 
already critical social situation246. 
 
Ultimately, it is important to remember that these legal reforms whenever based on national 
security arguments, are in contrast with the text of the Convention for the reason that Article 9 of 
the Convention, as already pointed out, does not recognize “national security” as a legitimate aim 
for interfering with the freedom to manifest religion or belief, and this omission is not fortuitous 
because it “reflects the primordial importance of religious pluralism as one of the foundations of 
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a democratic society within the meaning of the Convention and the fact that a State cannot dictate 
what a person believes or take coercive steps to make him change his beliefs”247. 
 
2.3.4 The enforcement of the right 
First of all, we must stress that freedom of thought, conscience, religious as a very delicate 
matter, implies that any attempt to enforce or strengthen the legal provision through the 
legislative process is probably not a proper strategy to be followed; at the same time, the 
argument, as a global issue, can not be addressed with a local or national approach. 
The desirable path forward is to considering as enforcement mechanisms the several 
recommendations stemming from the full understanding of soft law instruments and, above all, 
the EU Guidelines on the promotion and protection of freedom of religion or belief248. 
Beginning with the fundamental principle according with the EU and its Member States are 
committed to respecting, protecting and promoting freedom of religion or belief within their 
border249, it is reaffirmed the primary role of States in ensuring the freedom of religion or belief 
by guaranteeing that the internal legal systems are established in order to provide adequate and 
effective protection of the right; treating all individuals equally without any form of 
discrimination based on religion; putting in place effective and adequate measures in order to 
prevent or sanction violations of freedom of religion or belief and ensure accountability in case of 
violations250. 
On the same matter, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe also played a 
really active role in terms of recommending the way forward; firstly, with the Recommendation 
1962 (2011) on “The religious dimension of intercultural dialogue”251 addressed, among other 
things, to religious institutions and religious leaders in order to fostering a better understanding of 
each others, opening a more collaborative and intercultural dialogue and respecting the 
fundamental rights, democratic principles and the rule of law252; the Resolution 2036 (2015) on 
“Tackling intolerance and discrimination in Europe with a special focus on Chrisitans”253 which 
called upon the Member States to “promote reasonable accommodation within the principle of 
indirect discrimination so as to ensure that the right of all individuals under their jurisdiction to 
freedom of religion and belief is respected”254; the Recommendation 1804 (2007) on “State, 
religion, secularity and human rights”255, which draws some important strategies to pursue by 
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jointly States and Religious Leaders with the aim of standing against human rights violations256 
and, finally, the Recommendation 2080 (2015) on “Freedom of religion and living together in a 
democratic society”257, which further encourages the dialogue on the religious dimension of an 
intercultural dialogue. 
As a consequence, the actors that should play a major and significant role are, first and 
foremost, the religious leaders, who should make a substantial effort pursuing a global approach 
on a more collaborative and strategical plan of action; in fact, the religious leader, in particular, 
must make greater attempts to foster a more inclusive dialogue and tolerance with other religious 
and non- religious communities; they should unequivocally condemn the use of violence, 
physical and verbal, and make clear that those who use or advocate violence or exclusion do not 
legitimately act in the name of their faith258. 
An excellent initiative in this meaning is the one, launched in March 2017, after the 2012 
Rabat Plan of Action on the prohibition of advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred259 that 
constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence, by the Office of the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), called “Faith for Rights”260, an outstanding example 
of how the religious leader can and should collaborate in the promotion of human rights; the 
initiative provides a cross-disciplinary reflection on the deep, and mutually enriching, 
connections between religions and human rights and it is connected to the Beirut Declaration by 
the establishment of  18 commitments launched to uphold human rights, including pledges to 
avoid invoking “State religion” in order to justify discrimination against any individual or group, 
to ensure gender equality and minority rights, to refrain from oppressing critical voices and to 
engage with children and youth as well. 
The Beirut Declaration, in particular, considers that all believers should join “hands and 
hearts” in articulating ways in which “Faith” can stand up for “Rights” more effectively to 
strengthen each other rights in a model of peaceful coexistence. 
Assuming that religions or beliefs are a precious source for the protection of the whole 
spectrum of inalienable human entitlements and that religious, ethical and philosophical texts 
preceded international law in upholding the fundamental rights, the religious leaders have agreed 
on the following crucial points: freedom of religion does not exist without the freedom of thought 
and conscience which precede all freedoms; open a multi-level coalition; avoid theological and 
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doctrinal divides; speak against any advocacy of hatred that could amount to inciting violence, 
discrimination or any other violations and denounce any form of religious intolerance261. 
Therefore, the role that Religious Leader should play could be seen as a global mechanism to 
enforce freedom of thought, conscience, religious by stimulating the initiative of the States to 
implement and enforce the current European legal framework effectively; in Switerzland, in 
particular, Muslims leaders should play a more active role stimulating, on one hand, dialogues, 
debates, conferences with the local non-Muslim community and the politics and, on the other 
hand, speaking out openly against extremism and radicalization processes, The Forum for a 
Progressive Islam, in this regard, could be an excellent example for the way forward262.  
 
 
3. CONCLUSION 
The effect of the recent populist legislative tendencies results in sharpening new and old 
tensions between national and international legal orders and, in the European Union scenario, in 
particular, the most alarming outcome could be a potential and systematic breach of the European 
Convention on Human Rights and the liberal democratic values expressed in it. 
A first plausible jeopardy could indeed involve the foundation of freedom of expression, one 
of the essential pillars of democratic orders, the attack by populism, which often resorts to the 
concerning tool of hate speech, could come from several perspectives with greater emphasis on 
the field of pluralism and independence of the media and journalists’ activity, especially in 
Hungary, Poland, Serbia, France and Turkey; moreover, several concerns could come up from the 
analysis of the Holocaust Law in terms of consistency with the European standards. 
The enforcement mechanism, at the same time, gives rise to many problematic issues as a 
result of the intricate relationship between supranational and national bodies, as expressed clearly 
by the recent ruling, no. 22/2016 of the Hungarian Constitutional Court and, it could pursue two 
different and antithetical directions, a strong one, by mean of sanctioning through the scheme of 
Article 7 TEU and, a light one, by suggesting the adoption of all the necessary measures by soft 
law recommendations based on a more collaborative and open dialogue approach and, surely the 
latter is desirable by far. 
A second potentially threat could imply the essence of freedom of association and assembly, 
another crucial feature of democracy because is the primary tool for fostering pluralism within 
civil society, and in particular the role of NGOs could be highly at stake. The most worrying 
populist development is undoubtedly the recent “Stop Soros” reform proposed by Fidesz in 
Hungary which raises a large number of criticisms especially about the requirements of 
proportionality and necessity in a democratic society as interpreted by the relevant judgments of 
the European Court of Human Rights. 
                                               
261 Ibidem. 
262 See, e.g., the suggestion presented in Mirza, “Moderate Muslims in Switzerland speak out”. 
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Further, in order to understand how the enforcement could be pursued, it is meaningful, 
firstly, to affirm that States must fulfill a positive obligation to improve the values of pluralism 
and tolerance; as a consequence, with regard to the Hungarian context in particular, nevertheless 
it could be traced the existence of two conflicting paradigms within the national order, and 
between them should be stressed the importance of the role of the national States in order to 
implement the framework of the Convention as successfully performed in the Csullog judgment. 
Thirdly, a conflictual impact could entail the consistency with freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion, which as stated by the Court in the case Kokkinakis v. Greece is intimately 
connected with the foundation of pluralism that depends on it, and particularly with regard to the 
emerging tendencies of banning the religious manifestation, including the construction of 
minarets, by means of law; in particular, the most troubling cases of the Swiss referendum 
banning the new minarets and the emerging legal tendency to ban religious clothes in Austria, 
France and Netherlands; indeed, they pose many criticisms on the respect of the values of 
pluralism, tolerance and multicultural acceptance and, therefore, they seem to conflict with the 
requirement of the necessity in a democratic society. 
Regarding the argument of the enforcement, nevertheless, besides the importance of the 
international recommendations and soft law instruments, above all the EU Guidelines on the 
promotion and protection of freedom of religion or belief, it could be crucial the role that the 
religious leaders should perform towards a more inclusive intrareligious dialogue and within 
States, pushing and persuading national authorities to take further steps in order to comply with 
the fundamental scope of “living together”. 
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Annex 1 – Disaffected and Discouraged Citizens in the EU, 2016, Gallup World Poll 
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Annex 2 – La force des partis nationalistes en Europe. Infographie: I. Caudullo, données: C. Macherel 
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Annex  3 – Reporters Without Borders, for freedom of information, 2018 World Press Freedom Index 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
